In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

Fifth Air Force light and medium bomber operations during 1942 and 1943 are textbook examples of doctrinal flexibility and extraordinary innovation. The unprecedented success of both the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid illustrate how airpower became the dominant force in the Southwest Pacific....

The B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation is a coherent and nonpolemical discussion of the revolution in military affairs, a hot topic in the national security arena. Mark Mandeles examines an interesting topic, how can the military better understand, manage, and evaluate technological development programs. We see Murphy’s Law (anything that can go wrong, will go wrong) in operation. No matter how carefully the military designs, plans, and programs the process of technological development, inevitably, equipment, organizations, and people will challenge the desired expectations. The book focuses on the introduction of jet propulsion into the B-52. This case study illustrates the reality that surprises and failures are endemic to development programs where information and knowledge are indeterminate, ambiguous, and imperfect....

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................1 Chapter 2 Innovation and Military Revolutions ..............................................................4 Chapter 3 Logic and Procedure of Analysis ..............................................................17 Chapter 4 Prelude: Jet Propulsion and the Air Force.....................................................29 Chapter 5 The Introduction of Jet Propulsion into the B-52..........................................54 Chapter 6 Conclusion................................99 Table 1 USAF Engine Development Time.....42 Table 2 B-52 TimeLine...............................56 Table 3 Maximum Takeoff Weights and Combat Radii.......................................66 Table 4 XB-52 Performance Requirements..........................................75 Table 5 Boeing Company Comparison of Basic Turbopropand Basic Turbojet Models ...............................87 Appendix XB-52 Program Select Senior Personnel...............................................115...

First, this study develops a generalized model for United States military transformations in peacetime. To develop the model the author combines observations made by several historians about recurrent trends in military strategic innovation. The author concludes that, after taking into account inevitable uncertainty, there are three identifiable factors that occur in most cases of military transformation. The three key factors are the need for a coherent, congruent vision; an emerging culture that bolsters the vision and develops competing theories of victory to fulfill the vision; and a process for honestly assessing the maturing vision and its supporting theories of victory. After defining the limitations of the model and its usefulness, the author applies the framework to an important aspect of national security—the future of space power....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE TRANSFORMATION TRINITY . . . . 9 3 THE SPACE POWER VISION: MECCA OR MIRAGE? . . . . .23 4 CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SPACE COMMUNITY . . . . 39 5 ASSESSING SPACE THEORIES OF VICTORY . . . . 59 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 73...

This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The goal of this paper is to highlight the lessons learned from the selected operations and their applicability to twenty-first-century warfare. The author will examine the development of tactics and operational procedures that were unique to this theater of war and the leadership challenges encountered in a coalition or joint command structure. This study will also examine the effectiveness of combined air operations with the RAF in support of the amphibious landings conducted by the US Fifth and British Eight Armies at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy....

1 Introduction . . . . 1 2 ALLIED AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA . . . . .5 3 OPERATION HUSKY AND THE INVASION OF SICILY . . . .17 4 OPERATION AVALANCHE AND THE INVASION OF ITALY . .33 5 OPERATION SHINGLE AND THE ASSAULT OF ANZIO . . . .47 6 Conclusion . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 69...

This companion to personal professional study is intended to promote the early development of such a lifetime program and to serve as a tool to facilitate its planning and execution....

1 THE INFANCY OF AIRPOWER. . . . . . . . . .3 2 NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 AIRPOWER IN WORLD WAR I . . . . . . . . . 11 4 LAYING THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS, 1919–1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5 AN AGE OF INNOVATION, 1931–1941 . . . . 19 6 NAVAL AVIATION BETWEEN THE WARS . . . .23 7 WORLD WAR II: THE RISE OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE STRATEGIC BOMBING DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . .33 9 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE TACTICAL AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 11 WORLD WAR II: ROYAL AIR FORCE . . . .45 12 WORLD WAR II: SOVIET AIR FORCE . . . .51 13 WORLD WAR II: THE FALL OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 14 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—JAPANESE AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 15 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—THE USAAF IN THE SOUTHWEST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 16 WORLD WAR II: CENTRAL PACIFIC—NAVAL AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 17 WORLD WAR II...

The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three major phases: prehostility preparation, conduct of combat operations, and the results and analysis of the operation....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 3 2 EXPLANATION OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 5 Notes . . . . . . 13 3 CRITIQUES OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 15 Notes . . . . . . 22 4 THE BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 34 5 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR, GOLAN HEIGHTS ACTION . . 37 Notes . . . . . . 47 6 THE IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD BASRA ESCAPE . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . 63 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . 72...

Information technology (IT) and its gadgets provide no allure. They are neither a marvel nor a toy but exist solely to help get something done. This impassive attitude allows me to avoid capability hype with what IT can do and ask “So, what does IT really do for me?” This attitude is partly due to my mechanical engineering background and to the practical systems engineering philosophies instilled in me by my father. I have successfully exploited IT capabilities to perform engine cold-start analyses, design coal crushers, train missile crews, simulate radar satellite constellations, track satellite parts and construction practices, and create intelligence fusion software. But with each success made possible through IT came scores of frustrations that sprang from IT solutions. While writing this paper I came to realize that this frustration comes from man having to manipulate IT rather than applying it as an extension of oneself. This fundamental disconnect between capability and utility comes from disconnects between developers and users, institutional restrictions on individual innovation, and general ignorance of available tools, p...

Technical innovation lies at the heart of the case for privileging airpower in the American way of war, but such innovation comprises only one of warfare’s seven vital contexts. The sheer complexity of war and warfare renders prediction, technological and other, a high-risk activity. The contexts of war and warfare are (1) political, (2) societal-cultural, (3)economic, (4) technological, (5) military-strategic, (6) geographical, and (7) historical....

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii THE AIRPOWER ADVANTAGE IN FUTURE WARFARE: THE NEED FOR STRATEGY . . . . . . .1 Plan of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Why this Study? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Issues and Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Future Warfare: Contextual Realities . . . . . 20 US Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare . . 30 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...

Formative Years in Total War . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2 Marketing A Vision (1945–53) . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 Curtis E. LeMay and the Rise of the Strategic Air Command (1948–57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4 The Apogee of Strategic Air Command and the Missile Challenge (1961–62) . . . . 103 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 5 Flexible Response and the Ossification of the Senior Absolutists (1963–65) . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6 Absolutists and the Frustration of Airpower in Vietnam (1964–69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 7 The Vindication of Airpower and the Rise of the Fighter Community (1965–72) . . . . 185 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 8 Changing of the Guard: The Rise of the Fighter Generals (1973–82) . . . . . . 211 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . 3 THE ADVERSARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 THE PLAN: 3 AUGUST 1990–15 JANUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CLASH OF ARMS: 17–26 JANUARY 1991 . . . .28 CENTAF ADAPTS: 27 JANUARY–5 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 ATTRITION WAR: 6–23 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . 59 GROUND WAR: 24–28 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . .63 THE KEYS TO INNOVATION . . . . . . . . . . . 71 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Appendix A Primary USAF Units That Participated . . . 101 B Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 C Location of Air Strikes during Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 D Distribution of Strikes against RGFC Heavy Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 E Iraqi Prisoner of War Comment...