Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Iraq : U. S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance Updated April 5, 2005

By Katzman, Kenneth

Book Id: WPLBN0000173105
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 0.3 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Iraq : U. S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance Updated April 5, 2005
Author:	Katzman, Kenneth
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Katzman, K. (n.d.). Crs Report for Congress Received through the Crs Web Iraq : U. S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance Updated April 5, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.self.gutenberg.org/

Excerpt
Summary: Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a long-standing U.S. objective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but replacing his regime with a stable, moderate, democratic political structure has been complicated by a persistent Sunni Muslim-led insurgency. The Bush Administration asserts that establishing democracy in Iraq will catalyze the promotion of democracy throughout the Middle East. The desired outcome would also likely prevent Iraq from becoming a sanctuary for terrorists, a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report (Chapter 12, Section 2). On the other hand, U.S. commanders and senior intelligence officials say that Islamic militants have entered Iraq since Saddam Hussein fell, to fight what they see as a new “jihad” (Islamic war) against the United States.

Table of Contents
Contents Anti-Saddam Groups and U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Iraqi National Congress (INC)/Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Iraq National Accord (INA)/Iyad al-Allawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Major Kurdish Organizations/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Monarchist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Shiite Islamist Leaders and Organizations: Ayatollah Sistani, SCIRI, Da’wa Party, Moqtada al-Sadr, and Others . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 U.S. Relations With the Major Factions During the Clinton Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Congress and the Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Operation “Desert Fox”/First ILA Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Pre-September 11: Reinforcing Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Post-September 11: Implementing Regime Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Accelerated Contacts With the Iraqi Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Decision on Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Post-Saddam Governance and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Occupation Period and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . 17 The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 The Handover of Sovereignty and Run-up to Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)/Transition Roadmap . . . . . . 19 Interim Government and Sovereignty Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Resolution 1546 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Post-Handover U.S. Structure in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 January 30, 2005 Elections and Subsequent Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Insurgent Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Insurgents’ Size and Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Insurgent Goals and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 U.S. Counter-Insurgent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Options for Stabilizing Iraq/”Exit Strategy” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 “Iraqification”/Building Iraqi Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 “Internationalization” of Iraq’s Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Altering the Level of U.S. Military and Political Involvement . . . . . . 38 Negotiating a Power-Sharing Formula/Negotiating with Insurgents . . 39 Rejuvenating Iraq’s Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 The Oil Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 CPA Budget/DFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 International Donations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Supplemental U.S. Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Lifting U.S. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Debt Relief/WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Congressional Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44