Iraq : U. S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance

By Katzman, Kenneth

Book Id: WPLBN0000173110
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.3 MB
Reproduction Date: 2008

Title:	Iraq : U. S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance
Author:	Katzman, Kenneth
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Government publications, Legislation., Government Printing Office (U.S.)
Collections:	Government Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Government Printing Office


Citation APA MLA Chicago Katzman, B. K. (n.d.). Iraq : U. S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance. Retrieved from http://www.self.gutenberg.org/

Excerpt
Excerpt: The United States did remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from power in the course of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and his regime, contrary to U.S. expectations, survived post-war uprisings by Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds. Subsequently, the United States sought to remove Saddam from power by supporting dissidents inside Iraq, although changing Iraq’s regime was not declared policy until 1998. In November 1998, amid a crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections, the Clinton Administration stated that the United States would seek to go beyond containment to promoting a change of regime.

Table of Contents
Contents Past Attempts to Oust Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Ahmad Chalabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Kurds/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Ansar al-Islam/Al Qaeda/Zarqawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Shiite Islamist Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 SCIRI/Badr Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Da’wa Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 SadrMovement/Moqtada Al Sadr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Islamic Amal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 The Iraqi National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The First ILA Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Monarchists/Sharif Ali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Continued Doubts About the Capabilities of the Anti-Saddam Groups . . . 14 Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Pre-September 11 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Iraq and Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 WMD Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 The Opposition Positions Itself Before War/Second ILA Designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Decision to Take Military Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Post-Saddam Governance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Establishing Iraqi Self-Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Formation of the Major Party Grouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 The Governing Council and Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Roadmap to Sovereignty/November 2003 Transition Plan . . . . . . . . . 26 Iraqi Resistance and U.S. SecurityOperations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 The Capture of SaddamHussein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 The Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 “Iraqification”/Building Security Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Internationalization/U.N. Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Restarting Iraq’s Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .