...HE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992... ...Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From t... ...First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation... ...nd how the two agencies interacted eight years later, we will review their missions, command and control structures, and work- ing relationship on the... ...hnical surveillance and communications equipment employed for these casing missions included state-of-the-art video cameras obtained from China and fr... ...nts not only making connections with the U.S. government through their own missions in Wash- ington, but working through the CIA station or a Defense ... ...nt press reports to the contrary, there is no convincing evidence that the Spanish al Qaeda cell, led by Imad Barkat Yarkas and al Qaeda European fina... ...sociate Mamoun Darkazanli—see, e.g., FBI letterhead memorandum,Y arkas and Spanish Cell investigation, Jan. 8, 2003—but there is no evidence that Zoua... ...ed evidence that anyone met with Atta or Binalshibh in Spain in July 2001, Spanish investigators contend that members of the Spanish al Qaeda cell wer...

... a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin?s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988?1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992?1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda?s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996?1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERR...