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A History of U.S. Communications Security by the US National Security Agency. This 1973 publication was released to the public domain, but is heavily redacted especially in the beginning....

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I na Mamo o ka Ili i eha ai i ka Ihe a na Makua i makee ai i ka Laumeki, a i ka pua hoi no lakou ka hikimua o ke Ahonui a me Makahehi e hoomau ia ka holo-mua, ka maluhia a me ke Kuokoa o Hawaii nei:—...

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Alana Ia No Wilikoki. "kuahiwi nani o haleakala ka home o ka malamalama noeau, No laila ka ukiu,he ua nohenohea Ke iho mai le e hoonani ia piiholo. Heleuluulu ke ao Naulu e paio ana Me ka makani kipi o ka Akau, Ola na iwi o Kupuna ia oe He ewe, he io, he koko no Hawaii. He lei kou e pawehi ai E ohu ai ka oiwi maloeloe, O ke aloha hiipoi a ka Lahui O ke ala ia me ke onaona. Makee au ia oe e Wilikoki He Iholena oe, he Makahulu, No ke kiowai oe o ka Maemae O ko?u makee ia, e ola oe !Ola oe, ola kaua. ola kakou O ka I, o ka Mahi, ao ka Palena, E mau ke Ea o ka Aina i ka Pono E Uli e! E ola o Hawaii!!"...

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The study investigates whether information as a weapon can achieve the purposes of war. Specifically, can the use of the “information weapon” diminish an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. The results indicate that while information may be considered a weapon, it is one that must be used with caution. The more enthusiastic proponents of the information weapon tend to overestimate its ability to diminish enemy will and capacity to fight....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 2 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ—TIMELESS AND ENDURING . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 14 3 INFORMATION—THE ULTIMATE PRECISON-GUIDED WEAPON . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 23 4 ANALYSIS—IS INFORMATION A WEAPON? . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 35 5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION . . . . 37 Notes . . . . 39...

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In the end, the theories we considered can be synthesized to form a better overall description of the control of combat airpower. Centralized control and decentralized execution is a good concept at any level, but it suffers from lack of precision....

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Lt Col Karen U. Kwiatkowski’s Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa: Challenges and Solutions details air operations challenges in Africa. She discusses how the USAF currently meets or avoids these challenges. She contends that Africa is like the “western frontier” of America’s history—undeveloped, brimming with opportunity as well as danger, and that it is a place where standard assumptions often do not apply. Africa has not been, and is not today, a US geostrategic interest area. However, as the dawn of the twenty-first century breaks over a planet made both intimate and manageable by CNN and DHL Air Express, Colonel Kwiatkowski believes that the winners will be those who understand Africa and can meet the challenges of air operations on the continent first....

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1 WHAT THE WORLD KNOWS ABOUT AIR OPERATIONS CHALLENGES IN AFRICA . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2 WHAT THE USAF KNOWS ABOUT AIR OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Recent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 WHAT THE USAF IS DOING ABOUT AIR OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Some Solutions for Future Improvement . . .33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4 WHAT AIRCREWS KNOW ABOUT AIR EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 5 SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71...

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Minelaying by the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) had to overcome the absence of doctrine, serious questions of service autonomy, and preconceptions about naval and air force traditional roles. Though this initially unappreciated weapon gained considerable acceptance during the years of World War II, mines were not again dropped from aircraft in combat until the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force gave little effort to its collateral maritime missions until concern grew over containing an expanding Soviet naval threat. Today, Air Force capabilities for aerial minelaying and other naval missions remain an important (though little appreciated) means for projecting long-range air power in support of "Global Reach--Global Power."...

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1. MINE WARFARE..................3 Theory and History Mines and How They Worked 2. WORLD WAR II AERIAL MINELAYING IN EUROPE............7 First Use by Germany The Royal Air Force Fights Back 3. MINELAY’ING IN JAPAN’S "OUTER ZONE" -1942-1945............10 Early Plans and Capability U.S. Navy Submarine and Surface Laid Mines Air Operations Minelaying by Naval Aviation 4. AAF MINELAYING IN JAPAN/S "INNER ZONE" -1945...............18 Planning "Operation Starvation LeMay and the XXI Bomber Command 5. PLAN AND REALITY -THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AAF AERIAL MINELAYING............26 Plans and Opportunities “Outer Zone" Results “Inner Zone" Results Japanese Mine Countermeasures World War II Conclusions 6. AERIAL MINELAYING -AN AIR FORCE MISSION............31 Contributions of the Army Air Forces Mines and the Postwar Air Force Mines in Three Limited Wars The Lessons -Are They Learned? Applications in the Future Conclusion...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 A NEED FOR CHANGE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AS A MODEL FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 REFORMING INTELLIGENCE: A 50-YEAR EFFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4 THE 9/11 REPORT AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5 THE PUSH AND PULL OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 6 THE QUESTION OF BALANCE . . . . . . . . . 139 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Appendix A INTERVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 B CHRONOLOGY OF INTELLIGE...

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Developed as a souvenir for Sixth US Army's decommissioning in 1995, "Born of War ... Dedicated to Peace" details the unit's history from World War II until its flag was furled. Author Sharon E. Cathcart (writing under her previous by-line of Sharon E. Everett-Roles) and military historian Lt. Col. Edward J. Erickson composed the text; the layout was designed by Michael Murphy and historical photos researched by Sgt. Maj. Pat Maddox. Military history buffs are sure to be fascinated by this text....

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The predictable nature of American strategic bombing may make it vulnerable to a perceptive enemy. By offering him the opportunity to design, test, and employ countermeasures, American air commanders may have inadvertently limited their ability to achieve success....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EARLY YEARS AND WORLD WAR I . . . . 5 Notes . . . . 7 3 THE INTERWAR YEARS . . . . 9 Notes . . . .13 4 WORLD WAR II: THE EUROPEAN THEATER . . . . .15 Notes . . . .20 5 WORLD WAR II: THE PACIFIC THEATER . . . .23 Notes . . . .28 6 LIMITED WARFARE . . .31 Notes . . . .37 7 THE FUTURE . . . .39 Notes . . . .41...

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The thesis of this paper is that the advanced capabilities provided by TSAT are limited and will not be sufficient to serve the ground-based portion of the communications network supporting network-centric warfare (NCW). To validate this proposition, this study will start by identifying space-based systems that will enable NCW, discuss the requirements for ground-based NCW, and finally determine the combination of spaced-based systems sufficient to deliver advanced capabilities to the war fighter....

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This paper examines the long development of precision guided bombs to show that the accuracy attained in Desert Storm was an evolution not a revolution in aerial warfare. This evolution continues and gives offensive airpower the advantage over the defense. Guided bomb development started during World War One with the “aerial torpedo”. When Desert Storm initiated in 1991 there were very few guided weapons that had not been extensively tested on training ranges and in combat. The precision demonstrated to the World during Desert Storm started evolving when airpower was first envisioned as a new dimension for conducting war, and was far from a revolution. Now, the continued development of imaging infrared, laser radar, synthetic aperture radar, and millimeter wave radar autonomous seekers further increases the flexibility, range, and effectiveness of guided bombs....

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INTRODUCTION........1 EARLY GUIDED BOMBS THROUGH WORLD WAR TWO........3 World War One........3 Post World War One........4 World War Two........5 THE KOREAN WAR........19 THE VIETNAM WAR........22 Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs)........22 Electro-optical Guided Bombs........30 THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE 1970s........32 THE 1980s AND THE LIBYA RAID........35 DESERT STORM AND THE 1990s........38 Current Development Projects........41 EPILOGUE........48...

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Since our founding 50 years ago, the US Air Force has been responsible to the nation for controlling and exploiting the air and space environment. We are the nation’s Air Force—the only service that provides air and space power across the spectrum, from basic research to combat operations. In Apollo’s Warriors, Col Michael Haas, USAF, Retired, brings to life the critical, albeit little-known, contributions US Air Force special operations forces have made to the exercise of air and space power....

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In this paper an Air Force ground commander and scholar, Lt Col Dave Marttala, brings to light a problem previously overlooked in popular discussion: Air Force deployment of large numbers of Airmen to augment the joint ground fight and the consequent breakage of the US war-fighting capability writ large....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Myth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Convoy Airmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Assumptions and Expectations . . . . . . . . . . 7 In-Lieu-of Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Current Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Joint Requirements and Sourcing . . . . . . . . 8 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Popular Criticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Studying the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 CASE STUDY: SECURITY FORCES . . . . . . .17 Description of Security Forces . . . . . ...

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In this study, Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, PhD, analyzes the relationship between Iran’s strategic culture and weapons of mass destruction.

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This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task....

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During the Lebanon conflict, the Israeli Air Force(IAF) employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 2 2 THE LEBANON PERIOD . . . . . 3 Israeli Objectives . . . . . 3 Airpower’s Role . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 7 3 THE ISRAELI STRATEGY . . . . . 9 Defining the Israeli Strategy . . . . . 9 The Israeli Airpower Strategy . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . 13 The Shi’ites and Long-Term Security . . . . 13 Hizbollah and the PLO . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 5 EFFECTIVENESS OF IAF REPRISAL RAIDS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 19 6 WHY THE AIR STRIKES FAILED . . . . 21 Asymmetry of Motivation . . . . 22 Inability to Create Fear of Unacceptable Escalation . . . . 23 Lebanon Environment . . . . 23 Israeli Air Strikes Could Not Increase Costs on Attackers 24 Notes . . . . . 25 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 27 Summary of Findings . . . . . 27 Key Lessons . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29...