In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force (OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed, there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the spectrum of military operations....

This paper explores the relationship between Information Warfare (IW) and Public Affairs (PA) and reveals a direct link through the role of propaganda in each. A historical analysis of propaganda in past wars yields lessons which can be applied to formulating PA policy on IW today. In light of the evidence, three possible options emerge regarding the possible IW roles PA might adopt. Option One—a “Hands Off” policy—seeks to avoid any association with IW and represents the current PA approach. Option Two upholds the primacy of truth but acknowledges PA must take an active role in IW. Option Three suggests PA abandon its policy to tell the truth and actively en-gage in all IW activities, including disinformation. This paper finds Option Two as the logical role for PA in today’s environment and concludes with several recommendations to implement the policy....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 4 2 DEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE AND IDENTIFYING THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS LINK . . . . . 5 Information Warfare and the CNN Factor . . . . 7 Public Affairs and Psychological Operations Roles Begin to Blur . . . . 8 Notes . . . .12 3 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MILITARY PROPAGANDA . . . . .15 Revolutionary War . . . . . 16 Civil War . . . . .17 Spanish–American War . . . . .18 World War I . . . . .19 World War II: The War against Germany . . . . .21 World War II: The War against Japan . . . . .23 Korea and Vietnam . . . .24 Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War . . . . . 25 Summary . . . . .27 Notes . . . .28 4 PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPTIONS/IMPLICATIONS FOR INFORMATION WARFARE . . . . .31 Three Public Affairs Path Options . . . . .31 Option One: “Hands Off” . . . .31 Option Two: Public Affairs Conducts Information Warfare, Upholding Primacy of Truth . . . . .34 Option Three: Public Affairs Engages in Information Warfare, Including Disinformation . . . . .38 Notes . . . .40 5 CONCLUSION . . . . .43...

This study analyzes the concept of using expendable remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) for strategic offensive airpower. The author first outlines the historical base of the larger category of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The assessment of this background is that limited UAV development is primarily due to circumstantial historical events, including lack of user support, as opposed to techno-logical restraints. Second, the author addresses strategic offensive airpower. Airpower provides unique advantages to a strategic offensive force. Finally, the author presents a notional scenario involving conceptual expendable RPVs. This scenario provides one theoretical example as to how future forces could employ and control RPVs in a strategic attack. The overall purpose of this paper is to not only highlight the author’s concept of future unmanned aircraft but to also encourage pursuit into all areas that may possess the potential to advance airpower....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 2 HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . 9 Notes . . . . .21 3 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AIRPOWER . . . .25 Notes . . . . .35 4 MERITS OF EXPENDABILITY . . . . .39 Notes . . . . .59 5 FUTURE NOTIONAL SCENARIO . . . . .63 Notes . . . . .67 6 CONCLUSION . . . .69 Notes . . . . .71...

This study analyzes the historical debate between the United States Army (USA) and United States Air Force over the issue of close air support (CAS). Specifically,this study examines four CAS subissues from World War I through the Korean War:priorities in the employment of airpower, the ownership and apportionment of CASassets, the most effective CAS command and control (C2) system, and the debate overwhether to procure a single or multipurpose CAS aircraft. The case study herein analyzes the CAS philosophy of Lt Gen Edward Mallory Almond, USA. The author reasoned that General Almond’s diverse background in Army, Navy, and Air Force theory and employment would make him a logical candidate for a study. While his opinions are much more complex than this abstract can do justice to, General Almond’s CAS thoughts evolved to the following: (1) Air priorities should first be, air superiority, CAS second, and then interdiction and strategic attack;(2) The Army should maintain operational control of sufficient (meaning “lots of”)CAS air assets and practice decentralized control (down to the division or corps level); (3) The services should b...

INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WORLD WAR I THROUGH WORLD WAR II . . . . 5 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . 29 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: A GROUND COMMANDER’S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . 51 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 69...

The B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation is a coherent and nonpolemical discussion of the revolution in military affairs, a hot topic in the national security arena. Mark Mandeles examines an interesting topic, how can the military better understand, manage, and evaluate technological development programs. We see Murphy’s Law (anything that can go wrong, will go wrong) in operation. No matter how carefully the military designs, plans, and programs the process of technological development, inevitably, equipment, organizations, and people will challenge the desired expectations. The book focuses on the introduction of jet propulsion into the B-52. This case study illustrates the reality that surprises and failures are endemic to development programs where information and knowledge are indeterminate, ambiguous, and imperfect....

Chapter 1 Introduction ................................1 Chapter 2 Innovation and Military Revolutions ..............................................................4 Chapter 3 Logic and Procedure of Analysis ..............................................................17 Chapter 4 Prelude: Jet Propulsion and the Air Force.....................................................29 Chapter 5 The Introduction of Jet Propulsion into the B-52..........................................54 Chapter 6 Conclusion................................99 Table 1 USAF Engine Development Time.....42 Table 2 B-52 TimeLine...............................56 Table 3 Maximum Takeoff Weights and Combat Radii.......................................66 Table 4 XB-52 Performance Requirements..........................................75 Table 5 Boeing Company Comparison of Basic Turbopropand Basic Turbojet Models ...............................87 Appendix XB-52 Program Select Senior Personnel...............................................115...

The United States has over the last 16 years demonstrated amazing proficiency in winning military campaigns, but failure in securing “a better peace” as Basil Liddell Hart advocated. There is a need for an interagency analysis model, owned by the National Security Council (NSC), that can determine how the different instruments of power (IOP) can contribute to the achievement of the national strategic objectives, including which combination of IOPs is most efficient, but it must also bridge the strategic level of war to the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, this paper proposes an analysis model based on Dr. Joseph L. Strange’s center of gravity (COG) model, Robert Pape’s concept of coercion, and effects-based operations (EBO). The model could create unity of effort in utilization of all national and international IOPs and in securing the necessary linkage among the three levels of war to affect the adversary’s will and his strategy....

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 PREPARING TO TALK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Types of Speaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Teaching Lecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Audience Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Selecting the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Narrowing the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Choosing a Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 General Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Specific Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Gathering Material . . . . . . . . . . ....