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The space industrial sector has been of particular concern given its intimate connection with national security operations and plans, its broad importance for science and technology, and its competitive position toward foreign governments and producers. However, the industry has been struggling, and without US government actions it may not have the depth and vitality to provide affordable solutions to future national security requirements....

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This study concludes that in order for peacekeepers to achieve their mandate, it is critical to possess strong political will and a minimum of operational support.Furthermore, regional organizations run the gamut in both political will and operational capability. Their performance indicates that when their national interests are at stake, the regionals demonstrate the required political will to persevere in a mission....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING . . . . . 5 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING . . . . . 13 PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. . . . . 19 THE US ROLE IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING. . . . .33 RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . 39 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . 51...

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One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical airlift capacity. In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF....

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In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

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From the Mind to the Feet: Assessing the Perception-to-Intent-to-Action Dynamic is an interagency, multidisciplinary collection of 12 essays addressing operational and academic perspectives on the elusive concept of an adversary’s “intent”—its indicators and relation to behavior. It is primarily intended for the operational and policy community in the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, and other US government agencies....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 PART 1 Operational Perspective: Basic Issues in Gauging Intent 1 From Shoe Leather to Satellites: Shifting the Conceptual Lens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Kathleen L. Kiernan and Daniel J. Mabrey 2 Betting Responsibly: An Effects-Based Thinker’s Framework for Characterizing Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Harry A. Foster 3 Gauging the Intent of Nation-States and Nonstate Actors: An Operator’s Perspective . 27 Gary Schaub, Jr. 4 From Observation to Action: Redefining Winning and Sovereignty for the Information Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 John W. Bodnar PART 2 Academic Perspective: Theory and Research in Gauging Intent 5 Anthropological Reflections on Motive and Intent and the Strategic Multilayer Ass...

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When the Cold War set off a prolonged arms race and space competition with the Soviet Union, this well-educated cadre of the greatest generation was ready to provide the technical and managerial expertise needed to meet the Soviet challenge. Combining patriotism with a desire to be on the cutting edge of technology, these “technocrats” played key roles in the defense industry, university and federal research centers, the military services, and other government agencies....

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DISCLAIMER...............................................ii FOREWORD...............................................vi ABOUT THE AUTHOR..................................viii ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....................................ix INTRODUCTION..........................................x Chapter 1 GERMINATION OF OUTER SPACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT.......................................1 Chapter 2 AIR FORCE OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON SPACE.....17 Chapter 3 AIR FORCE AS A BACKSEAT “DRIVER” IN SPACE LAW DEBATES................41 Chapter 4 PROJECT WEST FORD..................58 Chapter 5 MAJ GEN ALBERT M. KUHFELD AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP OF SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT...........................................64 Chapter 6 THE 1972 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CONVENTION............................................75 EPILOGUE.................................................86 Appendix A AIR STAFF REACTION TO PROJECT RAND REPORT DATED 28 OCTOBER 1957......90 Appendix B CONCLUSIONS OF THE AIR DOCTRINE BRANCH STUDY 8 OCTOBER 1958.......................................................92 Appendix C EXCERPTS FROM THE OPERATIONS COORDINATIN...

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In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

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This paper briefly traces the evolution of the military/media clash and identifies the Vietnam War as the turning point where mutual trust seemed to be permanently damaged. Government and military leadership pathologies combined with press distortions to leave the impression on the world stage that American wars could be won or lost in the news media. Right or wrong, the effects of a war perceived to be lost in the media, precipitated media safeguards to insure military campaigns in Grenada and Panama would not be lost on television news. While these safeguards and press controls became somewhat tempered by the time of the Gulf War, the Rubicon had been crossed. Military commanders could never again afford to ignore the way combat operations would be portrayed in the news media. This essential consideration for any would-be combat commander constitutes the new principle of war: media-spin....

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This study reveals how airpower made four contributions to the collapse of Italy. First, airpower shaped the grand strategy of the western Allied powers in 1943. Second, mainland attacks against rail marshaling yards, ports, and airfields did indirectly contribute militarily to Operations Husky and Avalanche. Third, both American and British strategic bombing contributed to the psychological decapitation and fall of the Fascist government on 25 July 1943. Finally, airpower coerced and aided the interim Marshal Pietro Badoglio’s government to surrender unconditionally and escape to the Allies on 9 September....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 AN UNEXAMINED VICTORY . . . . . 3 WHEN GIANTS WALKED THE EARTH . . . . . 7 A TALE OF TWO TIGERS . . . . . 19 WHEN IN ROME . . . . 37 THE DENOUEMENT OF DEFEAT . . . . 57 NO CROWING FOR A NEW DAWN . . . . . 71...

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In GPS and Galileo: Friendly Foes?, Lt Col Roftiel Constantine, United States Air Force (USAF), analyzes the heated competition to provide service from high in the skies of medium earth orbit. The European Union (EU) is developing Galileo, its own global positioning and navigation satellite system, scheduled to be operational by 2010. The EU states that Galileo will provide greater precision to all users than is currently available from the United States’ (US) global positioning system (GPS) through improved coverage of satellite signals at higher latitudes, and, unlike GPS, Galileo will be guaranteed to be always available—even during war or political disagreement. Regarding the enormous importance of GPS to the United States and millions of users worldwide, the prospect of a second, competing, and potentially interfering global satellite navigation system could have serious military, foreign policy, and industrial implications. The US government would benefit from the heightened awareness of the risks and opportunities Colonel Constantine presents for the United States surrounding the Galileo program....

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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE GPS AND GALILEO PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 GALILEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5 FIVE STEPS THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD UNDERTAKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55...

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Information is one of the most, if not the most, essential elements of combat capability. Because telecommunications affects every aspect of a society, and is probably the most important medium which military information is exchanged, this thesis provides an understanding of the telecommunications system and how best to exploit it across the spectrum of conflict. I examine the system’s vulnerabilities to both lethal and nonlethal attack mechanisms. While the ability to employ nonlethal technologies are currently limited, I recommend pursuing a strong research and development program to acquire this capability. The reason is that they provide additional policy options to deal with conflict, they are cheap, and because research may not only discover unanticipated capabilities for the US, but also identify countermeasures to protect our own systems. This thesis concludes by offering guidelines to help determine whether to exploit telecommunications with either lethal or nonlethal attack strategies....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . 1 Notes . . . 3 2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS . . . . . 5 The Modern Communications System . . . . . 6 Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . 17 Targeting . . . . 23 Quantification . . . . . 29 Conclusion . . . 32 Notes . . . 35 3 DISABLING WEAPONS . . . . . . 38 Definition . . . . . 39 History And Legal Considerations . . . . . 41 Conventional And Disabling Kill Mechanisms . . . 44 Advantages/Disadvantages . . . . . . 49 Conclusion . . . . 53 Notes . . . . 55 4 GUIDANCE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING . . . . . . 57 Planning Factors . . . . 57 Conclusion . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . 62...

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This paper shows that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other counterinsurgency operations, space forces will not be “war winners” but can provide crucial support. Specifically, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities can help isolate the battlespace. These systems can also enhance the ability to combat fielded rebels through surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications. Finally, the effects space forces generate can support the government and help strengthen its ability to solve the insurgents’ cause. The discussion concludes with specific recommendations to improve performance against this and future insurrections....

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Colonel Hesterman's analysis of this subject is accurate and timely. She provides a fresh look at the criminal/terrorist nexus and by examining corporate trends, provides unique insights into funding aspects of both activities. This important subject matter is ripe for further policy and substantive analytical focus. Analysts and policy makers alike can certainly use her study’s conclusions and recommendations in their efforts to protect our nation against this vexing threat....

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1 “A POISONOUS BREW” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 TRANSNATIONAL CRIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE CRIMINAL-TERRORIST NEXUS: FUNDING TERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4 TERRORIST GROUPS: CORPORATE TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5 CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59...

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To ensure that the DOD is properly managing taxpayer’s money while still providing the best for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, we must not pay just lip service to this upcoming quadrennial defense review....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 Alternati ves for the Next QDR . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 Recommendation for Implementing a PQDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33...

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In “The National Guard Citizen-Soldier,” Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy....

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The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

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PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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This thesis examines three campaigns during which aerial terror raids, peripheral to the main war efforts and incapable of destroying the enemy war-making capacity, elicited disproportionate reactions from the targeted leaderships. The raids on London during World War I, the V-1 and V-2 raids on London three decades later, and the Scud attacks on Israel during Desert Storm each show evidence of overreaction by Allied/coalition leaders. A review of the nature of terrorism and of airpower reveals that aerial weapons are uniquely suitable as terror weapons. An analysis of the differences between nuisance attacks and conventional civilian bombing, along with an understanding of the pressures on the leaders involved, leads to an explanation for past overreactions: aerial terror raids shock targeted leaders into visceral responses. Historically short-lived, these responses are based on the pressures of representative government and the tendency to overestimate the capability of terror weapons while underestimating the resilience of the population....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE ANATOMY OF TERROR . . . . . 3 BEYOND THE TRENCHES . . . . 9 “V” FOR VENGEANCE . . . . . 13 DECISIVE TERROR . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . . 25 CONCLUSION . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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None before Prof. John Norton Moore has argued the value of democratic principles in deterrence and conflict avoidance. In this important book, Dr. Gary Sharp analyzes the concepts in Moore’s seminal work The War Puzzle (2005), which describes Moore’s incentive theory of war avoidance. Sharp carefully dissects Moore’s deterrence model and examines those incentives that discourage nondemocratic governments from pursuing violent conflicts. Arguing that existing democracies must make an active effort to foster the political environment in which new democracies can develop, Sharp discusses the elements critical to promoting democratization and thus strengthening system wide deterrence at the state and international levels....

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1 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS GLOBAL INFLUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Features of a Liberal Democracy . . . . . . . . .2 Global Political Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 2 CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF WAR AND WAR AVOIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Conventional Thinking on the Cause of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Conventional Approaches to War Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Deterrence as a Tool of War Avoidance . . . .31 The Law of Conflict Management . . . . . . .35 The Future of Armed Conflict . . . . . . . . . . 38 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3 THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE PRINCIPLE . . . .45 The Early Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Contemporary Studies and Methodologies . 49 Explanations for the Democratic Peace Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Challenges and Alternate Rationales . . . . . 72 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 ...

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Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...

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Air Force colonel Chad Manske traces the roots of the NSC to its organizational prototype—the British Committee of Imperial Defence. By comparing these institutions, their functions, purposes, leadership, and assessing how each changed over time, we gain an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of these different approaches to policy development. Colonel Manske successfully draws on comparative historical experience to make sound recommendations for strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of the National Security Council as a deliberative policy coordinating body within the Executive Office of the President....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 The British Committee of Imperial Defence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 3 The US National Security Council . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4 The Committee of Imperial Defence and the National Security Council: Comparison and Contrast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 5 Analysis, Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90...

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Air War College Maxwell Paper Anthology, a compilation of the award-winning papers from our 2010 graduates. Since we published the first Maxwell Paper in May 1996, we have distributed 47 papers demonstrating the highest level of analytical creativity and scholarship. The 12 papers presented here provide insight into and promote discussion on topics of importance to senior leaders....

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48 ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER: REVAMPING AN INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSING MASTER TENET . . . . . . . . .1 Col Rolanda Burnett Sr., USAF 49 THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN THE US MILITARY’S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF 50 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR: A CASE STUDY . . . . . .39 Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces 51 DEVELOPING A US EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE STRATEGY FOR FY 2010–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF 52 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET: A 21ST CENTURY ISSUE: LEGAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CYBER WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Col Rebecca A. Keller, USAF 53 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC . . .85 Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force 54 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE BELOW A 1,000-WARHEAD LIMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF 55 GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WH...

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Contents Chapter Page BOARD OF REVIEWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi A Perspective from the Commander in Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Barack H. Obama SECTION I: RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 1 Religion in the Military: Finding the Proper Balance . . . . . . . . 15 Barry W. Lynn 2 Burning Bibles and Censoring Prayers: Is That Defending Our Constitution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Gordon James Klingenschmitt 3 The Need for (More) New Guidance Regarding Religious Expression in the Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Paula M. Grant 4 The One True Religion in the Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 James E. Parco and Barry S. Fagin 5 Against All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Chris Rodda 6 Religious...

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Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affected both interagency processes and policy outcomes during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and the early stages of the Bosnia crisis (1993–95). Going one-on-one with members of Washington’s policy elite who were involved directly in these two cases, the author demonstrates that the US government’s approach to termination policy proved fragmented and personality driven. She systematically presents evidence to support the study’s conclusion, revealing that the nature of the gap between diplomats and war fighters will consistently produce policies that bring about cease-fire in the form of war termination, but fail to address the underlying causes and conditions that generated conflict (and, potentially, war). These issues must be resolved if the US government hopes to improve the social and political conditions of those embroiled in conflict while at the same time bolstering a security posture favorable to US interests in the aftermath of intervention. The three sections of this work thematically present...

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PART I Framing the Problem 1 CONFLICT TERMINATION WITHIN A BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . 3 Interagency Decision Making via Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . 5 The Efficacy of the Policy-Making Process . . 14 Outline of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHOICE . . . . . . . 27 Decision-Making Approaches: Units of Analysis as Delimiters . . . . . . . . . 28 Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Groups as “Less than Rational” Actors . . . . .41 Rationale for Alternative Approaches . . . . . .48 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 CONFLICT TERMINATION MODELS . . . . . . 61 Points or Processes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 Rational Actor Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . 85 Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Approach . . . . 85 US Government Decision Making . . . . . . . . 92 ...