Description Details
According to CMSgt Cari Kent, 30th Space Wing command chief, it is at basic training that Airmen learn everything they need to succeed in the Air Force.1 In recent incidents, Airmen have exhibited unacceptable actions. These range from transporting cruise missiles loaded with warheads from Minot to Barksdale AFB in 2007 and erroneously shipping nuclear-missile fuses to Taiwan in 2006, to other lesser-known infractions in the Air Force. Certainly, the remedy to such attitudes and behaviors could not be simply applying lessons learned at basic training. Or could the application of the basics taught to initial trainees have changed the course of some of these events? What do Airmen experience at basic training that leads the chief to this conclusion?...

Description Details
This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

Description Details
Colonel Lenderman explores the increase in the number and influence of mobility generals in the late twentieth century and looks toward the future, presenting possible reasons why these generals will continue to rise or why their opportunities may be limited. She concludes by discussing the significance of this study as it pertains to the Air Force’s development and the nation’s security....

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1 MAHAN AND THE PURPOSE OF AIRPOWER . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 THE RISE OF MOBILITY OPERATIONS . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 THE RISE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4 THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
Present and future force presentation options include more than just the single air domain, for the presentation of Air Force operations now includes the air, space, and cyberspace domains....

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DISCLAIMER . . . .ii FUTURE OPERATOR SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS Introduction/Background . . . .1 Methodology . . . .2 Determining the Future Operator Definition . . . . 5 Cross-domain Competencies . . . . 7 Cross-domain Force Development Path . . . .9 Force Development Paradigms . . . .18 Culture . . . .19 Summary . . . . .21...

Description Details
This paper examines the current USAF criteria for inducting C-130 aircraft into programmed depot maintenance (PDM) based on the mission, design, and series (MDS) of the aircraft. An alternative approach using an analytical model is developed in an attempt to refine the current process....

Description Details
Experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF’s ability to engage time-critical targets. The weakness stems from airpower’s inability to employ force quickly and kill an emerging target before it disappears back into hiding. USAF’s engagement sequence, called the kill chain, is not fast enough to detect, locate, identify, and engage the target. Experience shows that the enemy has used this method of emerging, engaging, and dispersing since the beginning of time, and because it is still effective, the enemy has little reason to change. To help solve this difficulty, this study introduces and investigates two methods—reactive and preemptive—and determines how they might solve the problem in 2010....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . 7 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . .23 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . 43 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . 61...

Description Details
In this paper an Air Force ground commander and scholar, Lt Col Dave Marttala, brings to light a problem previously overlooked in popular discussion: Air Force deployment of large numbers of Airmen to augment the joint ground fight and the consequent breakage of the US war-fighting capability writ large....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Myth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Convoy Airmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Assumptions and Expectations . . . . . . . . . . 7 In-Lieu-of Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Current Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Joint Requirements and Sourcing . . . . . . . . 8 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Popular Criticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Studying the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 CASE STUDY: SECURITY FORCES . . . . . . .17 Description of Security Forces . . . . . ...

Description Details
Colonel Paul “P. J.” McAneny offers an analysis focused on aircraft maintenance but applicable to the entire force and recommends cultural changes to support lasting transformation. He examines the impact of metrics on transformation and evaluates the USAF aircraft maintenance culture. He asks several questions: Can focused metrics precede cultural change? Does the aircraft maintenance community support a Red Is Good culture, in which metrics are used to illuminate problems rather than measure success or failure? If so, is the community a true learning organization that can maximize its impact through continuous process-improvement initiatives? The answers lead Colonel McAneny to recommend several Air Force–level changes to meet long-term aircraft readiness and reliability targets....

Description Details
Regardless of one’s views on the AEF, this paper presents points for discussion as the Air Force comes to grips with both the changing nature of future conflict and the Air Force’s ability to provide the National Command Authorities with a credible aerospace force. We encourage open debate on this critical topic....

Description Details
The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a background chapter that explains the current system, which provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information, shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85...

Description Details
The basic hypothesis explored in this paper is that organizational culture and institutional agendas significantly affected the rise and fall of the Twenty-third Air Force. The significance of this research effort is clear considering the 1 October 2003 merger of Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and AFSOF under the aegis of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). In light of recent events, this study’s ultimate goal is to provide a preview of how culture may affect AFSOC’s endeavors to strengthen CSAR capabilities. By studying the past, this paper looks for glimpses into the future....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 HERITAGE AND CULTURE OF AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES . . . . . . . . . .29 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 4 HERITAGE AND CULTURE OF AIR RESCUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 5 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: THE RISE OF THE TWENTY-THIRD AIR FORCE . . . . . .101 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 6 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: THE FALL OF THE TWENTY-THIRD AIR FORCE . . . . .137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 7 FROM THE PAST, THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . 171 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 APPENDIX: DESERT ONE ANALYSIS . . . . . . .183 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .199...

Description Details
This study uses Brig Gen J. F. C. Fuller’s theory of war to investigate the motivation of pilots flying in combat. The study holds the physical and cognitive domains of war variables constant and analyzes the moral domain effects on pilot behavior....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 THE MORAL DOMAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 3 METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40...

Description Details
In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

Description Details
With the ending of the Cold War, the apparent conclusion of many political leaders of states that war is hardly a practical tool of statesmanship, and the recent preoccupations of the American military on counterinsurgency, some people have wondered whether the original reasons for the founding of a separate air force are any longer valid. The original argument for the autonomous air force was that its Airmen would be the only ones whose perception was concentrated on the global level. The conclusion is therefore that the argument remains valid that a service with consistent culture focused on the problems of global vigilance, global reach, and global power is a fundamental requirement for United States national security. Only an organization made up of Airmen whose indoctrination from the start of their service is concentrated on a global outlook can satisfy that requirement. ...

Description Details
In this study Mr. James Lafrenz, a civil engineer in the Department of the Air Force, notes that American global security policy requires expedient responses to war, to natural disasters, and to problems between thes e two extremes. The Air Force owns the assets to make these responses, but our response forces are “concrete dependent” airplanes need hard-surfaced runways from which to operate. And where there is concrete, there are usually buildings. Will these buildings collapse if attacked and subjected to blast loads? Are civil engineering forces trained to make rapid determinations about expedient protection at reasonable cost and within time limitations? Can the civil engineers successfully approach and perform search and rescue within a building that is subject to collapse?...

Description Details
Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force’s initiative to recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. This paper identifies potential failure points associated with the changing Air Force culture. Overall, the Air Force’s change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. However, it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system’s alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for long-term sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21....

Description Details
Having flown in a single-seat cockpit more than 14 hours deploying to Southwest Asia, I am familiar with the negative effects of long duration flights as well as the impact transmeridian sorties have on an aircrew’s circadian rhythm. Any attempt to make that experience less painful for the aviators climbing into their jets during future deployments deserves pursuit and further investigation. Unfortunately, a great deal of the information available for the operational aircrews is either underemphasized at best or totally ignored by the personnel that the data is intended to support, the aviators. Typically, fatigue and circadian rhythm disruption are assumed as “necessary evils” that aviators have no choice but to accept. Yet fatigue can be a significant factor in terms of performance degradation and must no longer be overlooked. I have amassed the most current research regarding fatigue and its associated countermeasures, and I strongly recommend both commanders and aircrews apply the information presented in this research paper if they are to continue to safely meet the challenges of an Expeditionary Aerospace Force....

Description Details
Why was the United States Air Force (USAF) so resistant to the idea of dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses and electronic countermeasures support for its strikers? Why had they given the electronic combat (EC) mission almost entirely to the Navy? Was the technology of stealth really the driving force, or was there more? They needed money and technology to make them work. In short, I found the four elements of the model I propose in this paper....

Description Details
Professor Gray identifies and discusses nine fallacies that: (1) the USAF should abandon large-scale regular warfare; (2) airpower is inherently a strategic weapon; (3) airpower is driven by technology rather than ideas; (4) airpower is about targeting; (5) airpower must be subordinate to land power; (6) the theory of strategic airpower is flawed; (7) an independent USAF interferes with an effective joint force structure; (8) airpower is a minor player in counterinsurgency (COIN); and finally, a longstanding issue, (9) the twenty-first century is about missiles, space, and cyber power and airpower is yesterday’s revolution. The discussion of these “fallacies” should stimulate the appetite of most thoughtful Airmen, but also serious advocates of all services and everyone interested in national defense....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix UNDERSTANDING AIRPOWER: BONFIRE OF THE FALLACIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Fallacies to the Left of Them, Fallacies to the Right of Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 America, the Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61...

Description Details
Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation’s defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920–1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, of course, is that these arguments, which helped create an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today’s Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, “If they were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?”...

Description Details
This companion to personal professional study is intended to promote the early development of such a lifetime program and to serve as a tool to facilitate its planning and execution....

Table of Contents Details
1 THE INFANCY OF AIRPOWER. . . . . . . . . .3 2 NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 AIRPOWER IN WORLD WAR I . . . . . . . . . 11 4 LAYING THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS, 1919–1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5 AN AGE OF INNOVATION, 1931–1941 . . . . 19 6 NAVAL AVIATION BETWEEN THE WARS . . . .23 7 WORLD WAR II: THE RISE OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE STRATEGIC BOMBING DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . .33 9 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE TACTICAL AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 11 WORLD WAR II: ROYAL AIR FORCE . . . .45 12 WORLD WAR II: SOVIET AIR FORCE . . . .51 13 WORLD WAR II: THE FALL OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 14 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—JAPANESE AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 15 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—THE USAAF IN THE SOUTHWEST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 16 WORLD WAR II: CENTRAL PACIFIC—NAVAL AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 17 WORLD WAR II...

Description Details
As leaders at all levels, our Airmen must be able to anticipate and appropriately respond to a complicated and fluid national security environment. Developing such Airmen will require stronger commitments to education and training on the part of the learner to the point where learning never stops. Fostering this highly favorable attitude toward learning is possible only if Air Force education and training programs address learners’ goals, motivations, social interactions, and individual learning styles. This means the Air Force needs a stronger focus on affective learning during the instructional design (ID) process for education and training....

Description Details
In Unmanned Airlift: A Viable Option for Meeting the Strategic Airlift Shortfall, Lt Col Chad T. Manske points to the growing dependency on strategic airlift as well as the abiding corollary that there will continue to be a shortfall in strategic airlift. To get to the analysis, Colonel Manske raised three crucial questions: (1) are operational requirements able to justify unmanned airlifters, (2) are current and emerging technologies likely to meet these potential operational requirements, and (3) are the operational concepts cost-effective?...

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SHORTFALL . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4 TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 5 FINANCIAL CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99...

Description Details
Endgame in the Pacific examines the challenges encountered by XX and XXI Bomber Commands in employing the B-29 against Japan, first from India and China, later from the Marianas. In turn, it examines the adaptations required to meet those challenges....

Table of Contents Details
1 COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WAR . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 ENDGAME AGAINST JAPAN: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 APPLYING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 UNCERTAINTY AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6 TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ADAPTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

Description Details
During the Cold War, the Air Force had a fairly easy time explaining its mission to the American public. It also had a coherent public affairs structure to help execute that mission. The new threat environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, combined with steep personnel cuts to its public affairs community, have dramatically altered the communication challenge for the Air Force. To effectively operate in this new climate with an emphasis on strategic communication, the Air Force has tinkered with a few organizational models to strengthen the communication function....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 AIR FORCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: US NAVY PUBLIC AFFAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . .29 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...

Description Details
I believe the author has filled a critical gap in aerial warfare literature. Most works focus on the technical or tactical aspects of our profession and medium, but stop short of discussions of the broader nature of war itself. Consideration of war in that larger sense is essential for those who seek to understand and especially apply air and space power in combat....

Description Details
Lt. Col. J. Reggie Hall’s Agile Combat Support Doctrine and Logistics Officer Training: Do We Need an Integrated Logistics School for the Expeditionary Air and Space Force? examines the evolution of USAF logistics doctrine, the linkage between doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training programs, and the corresponding application of logistics employment and sustainment functions in a deployed environment. In doing so, he analyzes the USAF’s diverse logistics officer training programs to determine if there is a deficiency in interdisciplinary logistics employment and sustainment training. He ascertains whether or not that training shortfall reveals a gap between USAF logistics doctrine and expeditionary air and space force combat strategy. His study also investigates the USAF transition to the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) operational employment concept as the force projection mechanism for the expeditionary air and space force and the reliance on ACS as the primary enabler to identify specific areas here the absence of integrated logistics training impacts or potentially degrades mission success....

Description Details
Analysis of the percentage of men and women by commissioned years of service in the Air Force indicates that women separate prior to retirement more frequently than men. Having determined that women separate from the Air Force prior to retirement eligibility more often than men, Lt Col Laura DiSilverio wanted to find out why. The first chapter demonstrates why the Air Force needs women. It makes the demographic case and presents research results showing the value of diversity in general and the value of women leaders in particular. The second chapter presents the survey results, analyzes why women separate from the Air Force, and lists the types of programs that might retain them. The final chapter looks at the feasibility of implementing some programs that might help the Air Force retain more of its talented members....

Table of Contents Details
1 WHY THE AIR FORCE NEEDS WOMEN . . . . . 1 The War for Talent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Value of Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 WHY WOMEN LEAVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Reasons for Leaving the Air Force . . . . . . . .27 Retention Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 3 USEFULNESS AND FEASIBILITY OF RETENTION MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Home Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 Sabbatical/Break in Service Opportunity . . . 45 Permeability of Active-Reserve Barrier . . . . .49 Childbirth/Nursing Programs . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59...

Description Details
In the 53-year history of the United States Air Force (USAF), only two airmen have risen to serve as regional commanders in chief (CINC). During the same period, 74 soldiers, sailors, and Marines were selected for geographic CINC billets. In Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command, Lt Col Howard D. Belote examines the reasons for this disparity and suggests how airmen might improve their prospects for becoming future regional commanders....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON JOINT/COALITION COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF: LAURIS NORSTAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT WAR: ALBRECHT KESSELRING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . .53 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 FINAL THOUGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Illustrations 1 Allied Advances in Italy, 1943–44 . . . . . . 41 2 Commanders in Chief versus USAF Generals’ Careers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Photographs Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and Gen Lauris Norstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
Lt Col Clint Hinote looks at recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, interested particularly with the operational intersection of air and ground forces. He discovered a continuing dialog about one of the Air Force’s major tenets—centralized control, decentralized execution. He suggests that all parties, both ground and air advocates, may need to reexamine the purpose and application of this doctrinal point....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION: A CATCHPHRASE IN CRISIS? . . . 1 Salvaging the Master Tenet . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Historical Context and an Age-Old Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Breaking Down the Master Tenet and Understanding Fundamental Issues . . . . . 13 Challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . . . .22 Answering the Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Centralization versus Decentralization in Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 ...