The Air Force doctrinally advocates centralized command and control (C2) with decentralized execution as the best means to concentrate force on any facet of an enemy’s power. Although there are historical examples of effective command and control that have been less centralized, the USAF views decentralization as the cause of inefficient and suboptimal use of airpower....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . .10 2 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMPLEXITY . . . . . .13 Notes . . .29 3 DESCRIBING CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . . .35 Notes . . .51 4 APPLYING COMPLEXITY THEORY TO DECENTRALIZE AIRPOWER COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . .55 Notes . . .88 5 ADAPTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . .93 Notes . . .100 6 CONCLUSION—A CULTURAL SHIFT . . . .103 Notes . . .108...

Boyd and Warden represent a major transition in the evolution of air power theory. Early air power theorists argued that one could defeat the enemy by paralyzing his war-making and war-sustaining capabilities—a form of economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. In contrast, Boyd and Warden contend thatone should target enemy command and control—that is, control warfare based upon command targeting....

INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 THE NOTION OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 BOYD’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . 20 WARDEN’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . 30 CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI REVISITED . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 37 BOYD, WARDEN, AND THE EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER THEORY . . . . 39 The Past—Paralysis by Economic Warfare and Industrial Targeting . . . . 39 The Present—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Command Targeting . . . . 41 The Future—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Informational Targeting . . . . 42 Notes . . . . . 44 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . 50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

The term real-time information into the cockpit (RTIC) involves systems capabilities required to provide aircrews timely and essential off-board information to allow mission adjustments in response to rapidly changing combat conditions. The term military technical revolution (MTR) requires converging technological products which have a demonstrated military utility, and military recognition that the application of these converging technologies will cause a radical change in the character of warfare over a very short period of time. This thesis assesses the capabilities of RTIC from two perspectives: its impact on the air tasking process, and the command and control flexibility it affords the joint force air component commander (JFACC). It concludes that the impact on the air tasking process is evolutionary, not revolutionary—current RTIC capabilities remain largely dependent on human-intensive operations which limit reductions in decision cycle times. It further suggests that RTIC’s true impact on targeting is directly attributable to the increased flexibility provided to the JFACC for prosecuting the execution-day air tasking order...

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE AIR TASKING PROCESS TODAY . . . . . . . . . . 7 SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . 17 ENHANCING JFACC TARGETING FLEXIBILITY . . . . . . 27 A LOOK TO THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...