...HE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992... ...Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From t... ...ines Flight 77 p. 313 American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvania p. 413 Unity of effort in managing intelligence LIST OF ILLUST... ...eapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the u... ...re in NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (also known as NEADS), which is based in Rome, New York. That morning NEADS could call on two alert sites, ... ...ss and terrorist enterprises. In time, the former would encompass numerous companies and a global network of bank accounts and nongovernmental institu... ...strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan’s cur- rency. Some of Bin Ladin’s companies ran short of funds. As Sudanese authorities became less obliging,... ...ting on his cross-country test flight, Jarrah flew from Fort Lauderdale to Philadelphia, where he trained at Hort- man Aviation and asked to fly the H... ...arker,“U.S. Strikes Afghan, Sudan Sites, Retaliating for Embassy Attacks,” Philadelphia Inquirer,Aug. 21, 1998, p.A1. For a reaction to the later crit...

... a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin?s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988?1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992?1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda?s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996?1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERR...