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Regardless of one’s views on the AEF, this paper presents points for discussion as the Air Force comes to grips with both the changing nature of future conflict and the Air Force’s ability to provide the National Command Authorities with a credible aerospace force. We encourage open debate on this critical topic....

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The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a background chapter that explains the current system, which provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information, shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85...

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This analysis takes a didactic approach. It attempts to demystify the aura surrounding operational design by presenting a theoretical framework for comprehending its fundamental precepts. The goals of this analysis are threefold: provide a methodological example for understanding and applying design, show how design enhances decision making and risk analysis, and investigate the major differences between design in major combat operations and design in counterinsurgency (COIN)....

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1 The Process of Operational Design 1 2 Developing an Operational Approach 21 3 Methodology for Understanding and Employing Operational Design 31 4 Establishing the Link between Operational Design and Decision Analysis 59 5 Operational Design and Counterinsurgency 83...

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In Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations, the authors propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be accomplished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area of command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are performed but also integrated into the planning process....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM? . . . . . . . . . . . .4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EFFECTS . . . 17 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EFFECTS . . . . . . . 29 A GENERAL THEORY OF JOINT EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 AN IDEALIZED JOINT EBO PROCESS . . . . . . .55 WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE EBO METHODOLOGY?. . .77 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95...

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Control of the vertical dimension—air and space—is essential to preserving healthy commerce and situational awareness during peacetime and sustaining military operations during conflict. Air and space forces must be integrated in order to achieve rapid dominance of the battle space when necessary. While airpower has existed for almost a century, military space operations are yet in their infancy. Military leaders, planners, and operators are just beginning to recognize the importance and legitimacy of space as a center of gravity and war-fighting medium....

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This study examines the links between science, philosophy, and military theory. The author uses two case studies to demonstrate the links between these disciplines. He presents an overview on the rise of Newtonian science, and he examines how the key frameworks and concepts of that science became interwoven into Western civilization to affect its philosophy with an emphasis on its interpretation by the German Romanticist philosopher Immanuel Kant. He then shows how Newtonian science and Kant’s philosophy affected the military theory of Carl von Clausewitz. His second case study concerns the theory and philosophy of evolution developed by British philosopher Herbert Spencer and its influence on the military theory of J. F. C. Fuller. The author compares these two case studies to find commonalities between them that suggest a mechanism which explains how and why scientific theory and their philosophical interpretations eventually influence military theory. The author then uses this mechanism as a tool with which “new” sciences such as quantum mechanics, relativity, and complexity theory can be evaluated to see if and in what manner t...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE RISE OF NEWTONIAN SCIENCE . . . . . 5 KANT . . . . 15 CLAUSEWITZ . . . . 21 SPENCER AND FULLER . . . . . 29 THE PATH FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY TO MILITARY THEORY . . . . 39 THE NEW SCIENCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY THEORY . . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 59...

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To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison’s three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process;and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 METHODOLOGY . . . . 3 Jointnesss . . . . 3 Allison’s Models . . . . 4 Observations . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . 9 3 THE UNITED STATES NAVY . . . . . . 11 Beyond Visual Range Rules of Engagement . . . . 11 Analysis . . . . . 15 Joint Operations . . . . 19 Notes . . . . 19 4 THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS . . . . . . 21 Marine Air Operations . . . . . . 21 Analysis . . . . . 29 Joint Operations . . . . 34 Notes . . . . 34 5 THE UNITED STATES ARMY . . . . . . 37 Battlefield Preparation . . . . . . 37 Analysis . . . . . 47 Joint Operations . . . . 49 Notes . . . . 50 6 THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE . . . . . . 55 Deep Strike Coordination . . . . . 55 Analysis . . . . . 64 Joint Operations . . . . 66 Notes . . . . 66 7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . 69 Command . . . . 70 Doctrine . . . . . 70 Command Location . . . . . 72 CINC Interaction with Tactical Commanders . . . . . . 75 Information . . . . . . 77 Joint Force Integration . . . . . . 78 USAF/US Army Command Alignment . . . . 79 Summary . . . . . 81 Notes . . . . 81...

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Boyd and Warden represent a major transition in the evolution of air power theory. Early air power theorists argued that one could defeat the enemy by paralyzing his war-making and war-sustaining capabilities—a form of economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. In contrast, Boyd and Warden contend thatone should target enemy command and control—that is, control warfare based upon command targeting....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 THE NOTION OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 BOYD’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . 20 WARDEN’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . 30 CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI REVISITED . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 37 BOYD, WARDEN, AND THE EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER THEORY . . . . 39 The Past—Paralysis by Economic Warfare and Industrial Targeting . . . . 39 The Present—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Command Targeting . . . . 41 The Future—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Informational Targeting . . . . 42 Notes . . . . . 44 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . 50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

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This paper proposes two broad modifications to concepts and cultures to embed Effects Based Operations (EBO) at the critical nexus of the tactical and operational levels of war. Services, as part of the joint community, must narrowly define EBO in a quantifiable, measurable realm. The USAF needs to solve its tactical training/operational campaigning dichotomy by moving toward capabilities-based training. The services should stop clinging to the antiquated concept of separate and distinct levels of war with minimal similarities where no clear distinction actually exists. These small steps will build synergy between the execution of national policy and the planning that enables it. Such synergy may then aid the evolution toward the seamless continuum necessary for an EBO culture to thrive....

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In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

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What operational principles and concepts should be used to defeat a highly capable ground-based, strategic air defense system? This study examines the theories of Carl von Clausewitz, Basil H. Liddell Hart, Giulio Douhet, and Col John A. Warden III, and reviews United States, British, and Israeli Air Force doctrines for concepts and principles to overcome defensive strength. A historical analysis of Linebacker II, the Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Bekaa Valley Operation, and Operation Desert Storm shows the value of maneuver, surprise, and mass in sustaining offensive airpower. Four operational concepts are presented: the indirect approach (maneuver), the stealth approach (surprise), the mass simultaneous attack (mass), and a balanced concept (mass and surprise)....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THEORY . . . . . 2 DOCTRINE . . . . 7 HISTORY . . . . 11 CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS . . . . 20 CONSTRUCTING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS . . . . 24 CONCEPT FORCE PROCUREMENT . . . . . 28 TESTING OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS . . . . 30 WAR GAME RESULTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . 35 FUTURE IMPLICATIONS . . . SO WHAT? . . . . . .37 CONCLUSION . . . . . 38 NOTES . . . . . 38 APPENDIX . . . . 45...

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The method or objective of Strategic Paralysis is to selectively attack or threaten those strategic or national level targets that most directly support the enemy’s war-making efforts and will to continue with his current behavior. Strategic Paralysis warfare should result in a change in the enemy’s behavior at a lesser cost to both sides as Airpower assets are the primary weapons --not ground troops. Why Airpower? It is the only weapon that can provide the near simultaneous shock to the enemy’s central nervous system necessary to induce paralysis. To achieve success Strategic Paralysis requires four key ingredients: 1) Correctly identifying the enemy’s National Elements of Value (NEVs), 2) High technology, 3) An enemy dependent upon a well developed, modern and vulnerable infrastructure, and 4) Aerospace Control. The bulk of this study is devoted to defining this strategy and bettering our understanding of the first ingredient, that of choosing the best targets for attack....

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1. Introduction...............1 2. The Theory of Strategic Paralysis...............12 3. Choosing the Right Targets...............34 4. More Targeting Theories...............61 5. The National Elements of Value Model...............77 6. Conclusions...............110...

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Dr. William P. Head’s War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine is an examination of B-52 operations in Vietnam and how the air war affected airpower doctrine and theory. His study examines the evolution of this awesome manned strategic weapon in Vietnam to see how the design of the B-52s originally intended mission altered—if at all—the theories of airpower first put forward by Giulio Douhet and William “Billy” Mitchell. Dr. Head also analyzes how this same operational alteration affected official United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine first formulated by Army Air Corps and Army Air Forces leaders before and during World War II—later modified in the 1950s after the USAF became a separate service....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 AIRPOWER THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Airpower Enters the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . 8 America Is Drawn in Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . .10 DEVELOPMENT OF THE B-52 STRATOFORTRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Insurgency War and Doctrine in the Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Arc Light (B-52 Raids, 1965–68) . . . . . . . . .17 Modifying the B-52 Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Arc Light Expands and Airpower Controversies Grow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Arc Light Operations Continue . . . . . . . . . . 27 AIR FORCE THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 KEEPING A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT . . . . . . . 35 Project CHECO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Corona Harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 MENU BOMBING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 COMMANDO HUNT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . 42 AIR F...

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This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United States (US) military planning, the experience of US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. The problem is that military planners have little experience with engagement activities in the Newly Independent States (NIS), particularly in the Central Asian States. In this paper, I took a three-step approach to solving this problem. First, I familiarized the reader with ethnic conflict and its proximate and underlying causes. Second, I described what is at stake in Central Asia in terms of US interests. Third, I evaluated current US Central Command (CENTCOM) activities in the CAS and recommended some improvements....

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The possible use of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorist operations is drawing much attention in the ongoing global war on terrorism.The decision to apply nonlethal technologies requires an understanding of their overall effects, both tactically and strategically. This paper provides background information on both antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical technologies; their applications within the special operations forces (SOF) counterterrorist environment; and their operational applications during armed conflict, combat search and rescue, and hostage rescue. Comparisons of technologies are made, their differences highlighted, and recommendations for use offered. While it may appear that nonlethal chemical technologies are new, their path to development has been navigated with forethought and discretion....

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In this study Mr. James Lafrenz, a civil engineer in the Department of the Air Force, notes that American global security policy requires expedient responses to war, to natural disasters, and to problems between thes e two extremes. The Air Force owns the assets to make these responses, but our response forces are “concrete dependent” airplanes need hard-surfaced runways from which to operate. And where there is concrete, there are usually buildings. Will these buildings collapse if attacked and subjected to blast loads? Are civil engineering forces trained to make rapid determinations about expedient protection at reasonable cost and within time limitations? Can the civil engineers successfully approach and perform search and rescue within a building that is subject to collapse?...

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This British historian, David Hall, found relevant cross-service problems in Afghanistan during recent British air-ground operations. He was stricken by the similarities with British airground operations during World War II when the Royal Air Force and the British Army first struggled with doctrinal air support practices....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi LEARNING HOW TO FIGHT TOGETHER: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE WITH JOINT AIR-LAND WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Origins of the Air-Land Debate . . . . . . . . . . 5 Political Wrangling between the Independent Air Force and Army/Royal Air Force during the Interwar Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 The Battle for France, 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The Evolution of Air-Land Technique . . . . . .11 North Africa: The Adoption and Refinement of a New Air-Land Technique . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Success without Harmony: British Air-Land Co-operation by the End of the War . . . . . .25 Back to Afghanistan and Contemporary Air-Land Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Enduring Themes and Contemporary Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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National leaders are debating the merits of American weapons in space. A decision to operationally deploy such weapons would reverse the United States’s long-standing commitment to space as a sanctuary. That sanctuary—the idea that space should remain relatively unthreatened by weapons—has been challenged in the past but for the most part still exists today. Further weaponizing space, though, could change that and introduces important issues. The political, military, social, economic, and diplomatic ramifications of American space weapons demand that strategists carefully consider all sides of this critical debate. Current defense literature, however, indicates analysts and leaders have been slow to develop the arguments supporting a space sanctuary. This omission could undermine the military community’s appreciation for all aspects of both problem and solution. In turn the quality of the space strategy eventually pursued might suffer. This study attempts to understand the argument against weapons in space. It asks the question: Could pursuing a space sanctuary policy in the immediate future benefit the national interest? This study...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DEFINITIONS . . . . 5 SPACE WEAPONS AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE . . . . 9 CONTEMPORARY US POLICY AND SPACE WEAPONS . . . . 21 THE SANCTUARY ARGUMENT . . . . 27 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 47...