Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 A NEED FOR CHANGE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AS A MODEL FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 REFORMING INTELLIGENCE: A 50-YEAR EFFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4 THE 9/11 REPORT AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5 THE PUSH AND PULL OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 6 THE QUESTION OF BALANCE . . . . . . . . . 139 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Appendix A INTERVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 B CHRONOLOGY OF INTELLIGE...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii NOTE from the Commander of Air University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 PHOTOGRAPHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 WHAT BECAME OF THEM? . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . ....

Table of Contents Details
1 Do Concepts Matter· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 9 2 Instant Thunder: Why an Air Staff Plan · · 27 3 How Does Airpower Work?· · · · · · · · · · · · 51 4 Knockout Blow? Or Decision on Points? · · ·71 5 The Objective · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·85 6 Taking It to the Enemy· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·97 7 Seizing the High Ground: Airpower as a Maneuver Element? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 8 Setup for the Knockout Blow · · · · · · · · · 127 9 The First Information War · · · · · · · · · · ·145 10 Conclusions: What Is Air (and Space) Power? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 163 EPILOGUE: A View of the Air Force Today and Tomorrow · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·185 GLOSSARY· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 197 INDEX · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·201...

Description Details
At first glance, strategic aerial reconnaissance appears to be a mere technical tool. The term refers to the use of aircraft to collect strategic intelligence using photographic or electronic means. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), strategic intelligence refers to “intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.” Strategic intelligence includes information provided by sources other than aircraft, including naval vessels, ground communications intercept sites, satellites, published literature, defectors, and spies. Because Air Force aircraft provided the bulk of information used by American war plans from 1945 to 1953, this book focuses on the origins of the USAF strategic aerial reconnaissance. Although official JCS publications did not specifically list strategic aerial reconnaissance, the term may be defined as the use of aircraft to gather information necessary to conduct strategic air war, also called strategic air bombardment....

Table of Contents Details
1 THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 GROPING IN THE DARK: RECONNAISSANCE BEFORE CONTAINMENT, 1945 –1946 . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 3 FROM CONTAINMENT TO BERLIN: ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO FILL INTELLIGENCE GAPS, 1947–1948 . . . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 STRATEGIC BOMBING QUESTIONED: INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS AND WAR PLANS, 1949 –1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 5 THE TEST: STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE IN KOREA, 1950 –1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174...

Description Details
This study explores the contemporary relevance of the Guadalcanal campaign to current military operations. Specifically, it uses expeditionary joint air operations flown from Henderson Field during the period August 1942 to February 1943 as a case study for the employment of airpower from an austere airfield. Henderson Field provides a historical example of the expeditionary airfield as a center of gravity for joint military operations, and it demonstrates that key force enablers provide critical capabilities for the use of airpower from austere airfields....

Description Details
My intent is to establish that the media’s curiously limited coverage of the May 9, 2001 ,National Press Club briefing is highly significant. At that event, nearly two dozen witnesses stepped forward and offered their testimony as to personal knowledge of ET’s and ET-related technologies. These witnesses claimed top secret clearances and military and civilian accomplishments of the highest order. Some brandished uncensored secret documents. The world’s major media were in attendance, yet few reported what they saw, most neglecting to even make skeptical mention. How can this be? Major legal trials are decided based on weaker testimony than was provided that day. Prison sentences are meted out on less. The initial Watergate evidence was less, and the implications of this make Watergate insignificant by comparison. Yet the silence is deafening....

Description Details
Since the end of the Second World War, the US military industrial complex has secretly sponsored at great public cost the R&D of new technologies for energy generation, air and outer space f light, futuristic weaponry and other mostly military ends, which have not been made available for the common good. Yet today’s environmental and economic emergencies dictate that the accumulated know-how be used for the benefit of mankind in its peaceful applications....

Description Details
Based in Crozet, Virginia, Greer's Disclosure Project has convinced hundreds of insiders, including military brass and CIA ops, to defy nondisclosure pacts. They've coughed up documents (some still classified) and signed testimonials. Greer's got it all -- in fact, he gave Peter Jennings's producers access to these bombshell revelations for the ABC special on UFOs that aired last spring. But, as the good doctor found out, you can't give this stuff to the mainstream media and expect it to air on prime time....

Description Details
The traditional American military brute-force strategy does not always meet our national needs in this new world order. Strategic Coercion offers one alternative to this brute-force approach. Simply stated, strategic coercion is the act of inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which he is averse. It involves using force and threatening action to compel an adversary to cease his current activity, or coerce him to reverse actions already taken. Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE HUMP AIRLIFT OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Illustrations Figure Page 1 Air Force Leadership Framework (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . ...

Table of Contents Details
PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

Description Details
This study analyzes the role of the military commander in termination planning during operations other than war. First, the author assesses past and present political guidance, such as the Weinberger doctrine and the presidential directive on peace operations, as well as conditions that affect exit strategy planning. The conclusion is that most of the guidance is vague and that internal and external influences make the process of transforming political goals into viable military objectives very difficult....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Methodology and Analytical Criteria . . . . 2 Definition of Terms . . . . 4 Summary . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . 5 2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS . . . . . 7 Weinberger’s Principles . . . . . 7 Current Guidance . . . . 11 Planning for Conflict Termination . . . . 13 Summary . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . 17 3 SOMALIA CASE STUDY . . . . 21 Political Considerations . . . . . 22 United Nations Mandates . . . . 23 Exit Strategy . . . . . 25 Success or Failure? . . . . 26 Weinberger’s Principles Revisited . . . . 27 Summary . . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29 4 HAITI CASE STUDY . . . . 31 Political Considerations . . . . . 32 United Nations Mandates . . . . 34 Exit Strategy . . . . . 35 Success or Failure? . . . . 37 Guidance Revisited . . . . 39 Summary . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . 46...

Description Details
A huge portion of the military burden in support of these operations falls on the shoulders of the Mobility Air Forces (MAF). Lt Col Eileen M. Isola’s Leading Air Mobility Operations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies provides just such an educational foundation for MAF war fighters charged with leading CHEs. She provides a superb synthesis of a dozen years of lessons learned from many resources and institutions, sifting through the tactical and operational lessons learned so as to focus her research into the most important tenets for strategic success in a CHE: build a team of teams, gather and share information (not “intelligence”), and establish centers for interagency success. She reviews key joint and service doctrine manuals, culling critical nuances that would likely be overlooked by war fighters new to the CHE environment, or rushed in a crisis deployment. Her cultural comparison of the military and nongovernmental organizations is insightful and valuable. Throughout her work Colonel Isola provides tangible, real examples from past operations of what worked and what did not—and why. The implications for the future are clear...

Description Details
In “The National Guard Citizen-Soldier,” Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy....

Table of Contents Details
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 British Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The V-1 Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 American Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . 22 German Flak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Allied Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Fratricide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 The US Navy in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Japanese Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . .53 The Lessons of World War II . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2 FROM GUNS TO MISSILES, 1945–1965 . . .69 Antiaircraft Returns to Combat: The Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Antiaircraft Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 3 AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS: VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113 French Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 America Enters the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114...

Description Details
An Air Force RB-47, equipped with electronic countermeasures (ECM) gear and manned by six officers, was followed by an unidentified object for a distance of well over 700 mi. and for a time period of 1.5 hr., as it flew from Mississippi, through Louisiana and Texas and into Oklahoma. The object was, at various times, seen visually by the cockpit crew as an intensely luminous light, followed by ground-radar and detected on ECM monitoring gear aboard the RB-47. Of special, interest in this case are several instances of simultaneous appearances and disappearances on all three of those physically distinct "channels," and rapidity of maneuvers beyond the prior experience of the aircrew....

Description Details
This study analyzes the evolution of Seventh Air Force’s joint command and control (C2) relationships as well as the development of joint operational procedures and doctrine in the Central Pacific during World War II. As this was arguably the most joint theater in World War II, there are many lessons about the challenges of joint C2 and the development of joint combat procedures that are relevant to contemporary airmen....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 BEGINNINGS—THE FORGING OF SEVENTH AIR FORCE . . 9 3 EARLY CAMPAIGNS: THE GILBERTS AND THE MARSHALLS . . . . 21 4 LATER CAMPAIGNS: NEUTRALIZATION OF THE CAROLINES, MARIANAS CAMPAIGN, IWO JIMA, AND OKINAWA . . . . 43 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . 75...