Description Details
This study analyzes the effectiveness of airpower versus terrorism using three case studies.

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1 Terrorism: Its Impact, the New American Approach, and Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1 2 Operation El Dorado Canyon: Airpower versus Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3 Operation Infinite Reach: The 1998 US Embassy Bombing Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4 The Second Palestinian Intifada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 APPENDIX: THE OSLO NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
This study analyzes how the processes used in the national security planning influence the results. It begins by discussing the nature of strategic planning for national security, eventually defining it as a disciplined effort involving the allocation of resources to programmed activities aimed at achieving a set of objectives by integrating major goals, policies, and action sequences into a cohesive whole. The next step in this study defines several alternative methods for conducting strategic planning, including how using those methods could influence the outcome. The final section discusses the implications of the different approaches, including the recommendation that any review contemplating major changes in national security policy follow a more sequential and top-down process with clear guidance given to participants....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 5 2 NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING PROCESSES . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . 12 3 THE NEW LOOK OF 1952–53 . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . 29 4 THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW OF 1996–97 . . . .33 Notes . . . . 51 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 53 Notes . . . . 56...

Description Details
In this paper, Lt Col Gordy Hendrickson examines the recent history of the relationship and the Russian perspectives on that history and addresses many of the potentially contentious issues still facing NATO and Russia. He then outlines a useful framework for interaction between the two sides—a framework which can form the foundation for concrete actions and programs to continue down the path of mutual cooperation. Colonel Hendrickson concludes by proposing several practical steps the alliance can take to continue to effectively work with Russia and keep the relationship moving forward....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 BACKGROUND—THE LONG ROAD TO ROME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 3 RUSSIAN RESPONSES AND PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4 CONTENTIOUS ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 5 AREAS OF COOPERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 6 RECOMMENDATIONS—THE WAY AHEAD . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51...

Description Details
This study concludes that in order for peacekeepers to achieve their mandate, it is critical to possess strong political will and a minimum of operational support.Furthermore, regional organizations run the gamut in both political will and operational capability. Their performance indicates that when their national interests are at stake, the regionals demonstrate the required political will to persevere in a mission....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING . . . . . 5 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING . . . . . 13 PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. . . . . 19 THE US ROLE IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING. . . . .33 RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . 39 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . 51...

Description Details
This book examines the role that theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO played in influencing the use of airpower over Bosnia between the spring of 1993 and the end of 1995. It also uncovers factors explaining why top UN and NATO commanders in the region acted as they did. The central thesis of this study is that the commanders’ needs to balance the various responsibilities inherent in command powerfully affected their actions when they tried to influence the use of airpower....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA: 1992–APRIL 1993 . . . . . . . . . .57 4 NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIR STRIKES: MAY–DECEMBER 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 AIRPOWER THREATS, USES, AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: JANUARY–JUNE 1994 . .115 6 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTION: AUGUST–DECEMBER 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 7 PAVING THE WAY TO ENFORCEMENT: JANUARY–JUNE 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203 8 SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONS TO USE AIRPOWER: JULY–AUGUST 1995 . . 245 9 DELIBERATE FORCE: AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 10 CONCLUSIONS: MILITARY INFLUENCE ON AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA . . . . . . . . . . . . 313...

Description Details
This thesis follows the history of joint targeting boards since World War II to illustrate the foundations that have led to today’s joint airpower targeting process. Having established the historical background, this thesis explores the current solutions for determining airpower mission and target priorities. Using the principles of war as a framework for analysis, this thesis compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model to determine whether a targeting board is an effective tool for the JFC in future operations. In the end, this thesis finds a Joint Targeting Coordination Board integrated into the air component staff as the greatest potential for providing a future joint commander with an effective process for determining airpower mission priorities and selecting targets. Finally, organizational changes and recommendations are suggested to assure the targeting process overcomes individual service biases and remains focused on accomplishing the theater objectives....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 THE HISTORY OF JOINT TARGETING SINCE WORLD WAR II . . . . . 5 World War II . . . . . . 5 Korean Conflict . . . . 6 Vietnam War . . . . . . 9 Desert Storm . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . 15 3 THE JTCB TODAY . . . 19 Current Definition . . . 19 Where the JTCB Fits into the Planning Process . . . . . . 20 Model A—The EUCOM/CFC Model . . . . . 21 Model B—The PACOM/LANTCOM Model . . . . . . 22 Summary . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . 25 4 THE JTCB’S FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . 27 Assumptions . . . . . . 28 Methodology . . . . . . 29 Analysis . . . . 30 Assessment . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 46 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 51 Recommendation Number One . . . . 51 Recommendation Number Two . . . . 53 Recommendation Number Three . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . 54...

Description Details
The study presents and analyzes the pros and cons of three possible options: (1) increasing active duty manning in all Guard fighter units, (2) increasing active duty manning in only a few select Guard fighter units, and (3) moving most, if not all, of the fighters out of the Guard and into the active duty force. If current trends play out, the US military will benefit from having thought about, discussed, and debated this problem. In their insightful study, Lieutenant Colonels Lucas and Johnson provide a fresh approach to finding a solution....

Description Details
This study proposes a joint architecture that potentially would reduce the resources required to procure, move, store, and maintain bare base assets. Because expeditionary basing is one of its distinctive capabilities, the Air Force should be designated as the executive agent for joint bare base operations, with each service continuing to train its bare base support forces and meet its service-specific requirements....

Description Details
Cimbala seeks to reestablish relations on nuclear weapons control between the United States and Russia. He briefly describes arms control history to illustrate the complexities of building agreements as well as to find a relationship that leads to the satisfaction of both sides. He makes the point that more than just good relations between Russia and the United States is at stake. He suggests that when both Russia and the United States reach agreement about nuclear weapons, the case for controlled nonproliferation among the other nuclear powers can proceed, and that is to the good of everyone....

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FOREWORD . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . ix TAKING THE LEAD: RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AFTER BUSH . . . . 1 Arms Control—A Large Menu . . . .1 Context Is All—And History Still Matters . . . .4 Approach and Method . . . . . 8 Conclusion . . . . .23 NOTES . . . . . . . 23...

Description Details
Each year the USAF prosecutes approximately 35 retirement-eligible members; 15 of them eventually receive a punitive discharge at trial. While the overall numbers are not significant, the people behind those numbers are. During my tenure as a trial and defense counsel, I have prosecuted or defended four of those individuals. The military justice system owes it to its members to ensure that justice is done in all cases. Each military member facing a court-martial deserves to be punished for the offenses committed. Sometimes, a punitive discharge with loss of retirement pay is the entirely appropriate result at trial. Sometimes it is not. This paper is the result of my belief that the determination of whether members ought to forfeit their retirement pay should be left to the wise discretion of the sentencing authority and the convening authority, not to vague notions of collateral consequences....

Description Details
Doctrine governing the integration of air and ground operations has been a hotly contested area since World War I. Historically, the services have developed and published their doctrine separately, often causing seams in thought and execution. Although joint doctrine exists for today’s joint force, its development followed the same historical pattern—taking service doctrines and “melding” into joint doctrine. This construct for developing joint doctrine has its shortcomings, which are most often manifested where we least likely want to see them—on the battlefield....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 2 FRAMEWORK FOR INTRODUCING FUTURE JOINT DOCTRINE CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 SUPPORTED/SUPPORTING RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 4 ESTABLISHING DIRECTIVES AND EMERGING CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 5 SYNCHRONIZATION OF INTERDICTION AND MANEUVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 6 JOINT FIRES CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 7 FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 8 CREATING SYNERGY AND MINIMIZING SEAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent and how the joint forces commander (JFC) should control support from space forces. To examine this issue of in-theater control of space forces more closely, this study is divided into five chapters. Following the introduction chapter 2 looks into how space forces were planned for and employed during Desert Storm. This chapter discusses who was in charge and what planning processes were used. In chapter 3 lessons and initiatives to improve planning and employment of support from space forces are discussed. Chapter 4 explores the possible need to have one individual in-theater clearly identified as being responsible for directing space forces. Centralized control, similar to air, may have beneficial effects that allow joint commanders to take better advantage of space forces’ full potential. This study concludes by offering recommendations....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . 5 2 PLANNING FOR SUPPORT FROM SPACE FORCES . . . . 7 Notes . . . 15 3 LEARNING THE LESSONS AND SOLVING THE PROBLEMS . . . . . 17 Notes . . . 25 4 CENTRALIZED CONTROL . . . . . . 29 Notes . . . 34 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 37 Notes . . . 39...

Description Details
Organizational change strategies for acquisition are essential due to the enormity of change required of the acquisition community. The Congress and the DOD have made many previous attempts at acquisition reform, but most have had little effect. To make sure our current reform efforts make positive, lasting changes, we must transform the acquisition culture. To date, little attention has been paid to cultural change aspects. To that end, this paper offers some ideas for organizations undergoing change for acquisition reform....

Description Details
ANZUS is a defense alliance, a special and functional relationship between three close allies-Australia, New Zealand, and the United States .

Description Details
The primary conclusion of this study is that airpower, as a pervasive element of combat operations, will have an important impact on any peace enforcement operation. Strong, centrally controlled air forces serve to assert escalation dominance at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. They can also provide a coercive force that can threaten to escalate the fighting beyond peace enforcement on short notice.However, in almost all cases tactical aviation and special operations aircraft will be critical to support or protect ground forces and help control violence at the lower end of the spectrum. Peace enforcement operations are likely to succeed only when airpower is combined with dominant ground forces and strong diplomacy. Finally,peace enforcement is a complicated affair, perhaps even more so than war itself.Intangible political factors such as the cohesion of the coalition, its willingness to maintain a long-term commitment to the mission, and its ability to balance restraint against credibility will be the primary determining factors in the efficacy of airpower and the mission as a whole. Airpower alone will rarely offer the pos...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . . 5 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ: PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . . 15 INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: UNITAF AND UNOSOM II . . . . 31 THE AIRPOWER CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

Description Details
In Preventing Catastrophe: US Policy Options for Management of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, Lt Col Martin J. “Marty” Wojtysiak, USAF, proposes a response to the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. This paper highlights the threat in “The Nuclear Catastrophe of 2005,” a gripping projection of the worstcase scenario on the current realities of the Indian subcontinent. Written a year after the “catastrophe,” it vividly describes the events leading up to the disaster as well as the grim aftermath of a South Asian nuclear war. The remainder of the paper looks at US regional objectives and suggests how they might be achieved. The author proposes a regional proliferation regime that realistically addresses the threat and moves the United States to a pragmatic approach to manage and limit the ongoing proliferation in South Asia....

Description Details
The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest “ends” that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited “ways” and “means” be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen. Spaven concludes that “only by accepting the risk of stepping beyond tactical and operational thinking can the Air Force do great things for the poorest of continents.”...

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1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2 AIRPOWER IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 CURRENT US ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 4 WHAT CAN AIRMEN EXPECT IN AFRICA? . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 5 HOW SHOULD AIRMEN THINK ABOUT AFRICA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 6 CONCLUSION: A US AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75...

Description Details
Missile defense has become a key factor in US strategic planning. The problem, of course, lies with the stage of current technological development. Mid-course or terminal-phase systems appear closer to feasibility just now, at least theoretically....

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 2 Déjà vu All Over Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 Evaluation of Current National Missile-DEFENSE PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4 Asia and the US Missile-defense Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73...

Description Details
The overseas base planning process reflected the evolution and growing sophistication of American strategic thinking during the tumultuous period from 1942 through 1948. The results of the planning shaped, in many ways, the East-West struggle for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Elliott Converse has performed a great and remarkable service by capturing the often confusing and chaotic essence of the base planning effort during this turbulent period. His exhaustive research brings the issues, attitudes, and personalities involved into clear focus....

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1 THE FIRST PLANS, 1942–1943 . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2 BASE PLANNING, 1943–1945 . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 3 BASE PLANNING TAKES SHAPE, 1945 . . . . 101 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 4 POSTWAR ADJUSTMENTS, 1946–1948 . . .151 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227 ...

Description Details
To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison’s three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process;and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 METHODOLOGY . . . . 3 Jointnesss . . . . 3 Allison’s Models . . . . 4 Observations . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . 9 3 THE UNITED STATES NAVY . . . . . . 11 Beyond Visual Range Rules of Engagement . . . . 11 Analysis . . . . . 15 Joint Operations . . . . 19 Notes . . . . 19 4 THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS . . . . . . 21 Marine Air Operations . . . . . . 21 Analysis . . . . . 29 Joint Operations . . . . 34 Notes . . . . 34 5 THE UNITED STATES ARMY . . . . . . 37 Battlefield Preparation . . . . . . 37 Analysis . . . . . 47 Joint Operations . . . . 49 Notes . . . . 50 6 THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE . . . . . . 55 Deep Strike Coordination . . . . . 55 Analysis . . . . . 64 Joint Operations . . . . 66 Notes . . . . 66 7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . 69 Command . . . . 70 Doctrine . . . . . 70 Command Location . . . . . 72 CINC Interaction with Tactical Commanders . . . . . . 75 Information . . . . . . 77 Joint Force Integration . . . . . . 78 USAF/US Army Command Alignment . . . . 79 Summary . . . . . 81 Notes . . . . 81...

Description Details
With the ending of the Cold War, the apparent conclusion of many political leaders of states that war is hardly a practical tool of statesmanship, and the recent preoccupations of the American military on counterinsurgency, some people have wondered whether the original reasons for the founding of a separate air force are any longer valid. The original argument for the autonomous air force was that its Airmen would be the only ones whose perception was concentrated on the global level. The conclusion is therefore that the argument remains valid that a service with consistent culture focused on the problems of global vigilance, global reach, and global power is a fundamental requirement for United States national security. Only an organization made up of Airmen whose indoctrination from the start of their service is concentrated on a global outlook can satisfy that requirement. ...

Description Details
In The Politics of Coercion: Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post–Cold War Conflict, Lt Col Ellwood P. “Skip” Hinman IV confronts an issue of high interest to airmen and policy makers alike: What does coercion theory suggest about the use of airpower in the early twenty-first century? More specifically, Colonel Hinman seeks to determine whether any of the existing theories of coercion can stand alone as a coherent, substantive, and codified approach to airpower employment. Framing his analysis on three key attributes of conflict in the post–Cold War era—limited, nonprotracted war; political re-straint; and the importance of a better state of peace—Hinman examines the contemporary applicability of the four major theories of coercive airpower: punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 What Is a Theory of Coercive Airpower? . . . . 2 The Attributes of Post–Cold War Conflict . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 COERCION THEORY AND THE POST–COLD WAR ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Punishment-Based Coercion: A Theory for Total War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Risk-Based Coercion: A Theory for Limited War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Decapitation-Based Coercion: Echoes of the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Denial-Based Coercion: Too Much of a Good Thing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3 A NEW THEORY FOR A NEW ERA . . . . . . . .31 Phase One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Phase Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Phase Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Limited, Nonprotracted War and the Coercion Hybrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 The Coercion Hybrid and the Politically Restrained Natur...

Description Details
It is my hope that these three essays provide the reader with a better and more comprehensive understanding of the International Criminal Court, its development, and the reasons all Americans should be concerned. For the non-American reader, I hope that these essays provide a well-articulated explanation of our concerns about the International Criminal Court....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . .vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix Essays A HISTORY OF WAR CRIMES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Maj David A. Hater Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CASE OF THE UNITED STATES HAVING ITS CAKE AND EATING IT TOO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Maj Steven D. Dubriske Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 GENERAL WATSON TO THE ICC? THE PRESIDENT MUST DECIDE SOON! . . . . . . . . 71 Dr. Donald A. MacCuish and Lt Col Tomislav Ruby Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 APPENDIX: SIGNATORIES AND RATIFICATIONS TO THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC . . . . . . .9...

Description Details
This thesis describes crony attack, comments on requirements for successful development of crony attack methodology, and investigates a prominent case where the United States apparently used this strategy. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. It also outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy....

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1 Introduction . . . .1 2 Background . . . . . 5 3 Theory of Crony Attack. . . . .15 4 Strategy of Crony Attack. . . . .21 5 Operation Allied Force: A Case Study. . . . .27 6 Conclusions. . . . .41 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .43...

Description Details
Colonel Hesterman's analysis of this subject is accurate and timely. She provides a fresh look at the criminal/terrorist nexus and by examining corporate trends, provides unique insights into funding aspects of both activities. This important subject matter is ripe for further policy and substantive analytical focus. Analysts and policy makers alike can certainly use her study’s conclusions and recommendations in their efforts to protect our nation against this vexing threat....

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1 “A POISONOUS BREW” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 TRANSNATIONAL CRIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE CRIMINAL-TERRORIST NEXUS: FUNDING TERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4 TERRORIST GROUPS: CORPORATE TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5 CONCLUSION: THE BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59...

Description Details
To ensure that the DOD is properly managing taxpayer’s money while still providing the best for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, we must not pay just lip service to this upcoming quadrennial defense review....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 Alternati ves for the Next QDR . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 Recommendation for Implementing a PQDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33...

Description Details
Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

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1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

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Arguably a top tier concern for American foreign policy for more than a few years, Iran gets the meticulous attention of two distinguished Air Force scholars. Lt Cols Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays are critical of the current American policy toward Iran and tell us why. More importantly, they point to elements necessary for an effective Iranian strategy. Their aim: “to change the fundamental calculus of the Iranian problem” to one beneficial for both Americans and Iranians....

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1 SOLVING IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS: HISTORIC ROOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Ancient Persian Greatness and Cultural Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Resentment of Foreign Interference . . . . . . 7 Persian-Shiite Strategic Loneliness . . . . . 10 Pragmatic National Interest Replaces Revolutionary Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 ANALYSIS OF IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Demographics, Politics, and Economics . . . .24 Internal Dynamics, Personalities, Power Centers, and Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Nuclear Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 US PERCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Internally . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Externally . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5 REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY . . . . . . . ....

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One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

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Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

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Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

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The analysts were charged with the task of anticipating which specific contentious issues likely will propel large, organized political units to choose violent means of acquiring their sociopolitical objectives rather than attaining them peacefully. The units on which we focus have been traditionally identified as states, but we recognize that a host of new sub- and suprastate actors also will play major roles in such wars; hence, we also will allude to them....

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DISCLAIMER...............................................ii PREFACE....................................................vi HISTORY, CULTURE, AND CHANGE: FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICTS AND WARS......1 RELIGION-A BANNER FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICT............................19 NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION, ETHNICITY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER............................32 POPULATION PRESSURES, MIGRATION, AND REFUGEES...................................46 TRANSNATIONAL CRIME ITS EFFECT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY..............................................58 HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS............................................70 ANTICIPATING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMIC SOURCES OF CONFLICTS..........82 THE THIRD WORLD’S NONVIABLE STATES A MAJOR SOURCE OF CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY...........................96 Table 2..................................................101 WHEN THE WATER RUNS OUT......................................................111 TRANSNATIONAL AIR, WATER, AND LAND DEGRADATION PROBLEMS.............................................124 NUCLEAR CONFLICT AND NONPROLIFERATIO...

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Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affected both interagency processes and policy outcomes during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and the early stages of the Bosnia crisis (1993–95). Going one-on-one with members of Washington’s policy elite who were involved directly in these two cases, the author demonstrates that the US government’s approach to termination policy proved fragmented and personality driven. She systematically presents evidence to support the study’s conclusion, revealing that the nature of the gap between diplomats and war fighters will consistently produce policies that bring about cease-fire in the form of war termination, but fail to address the underlying causes and conditions that generated conflict (and, potentially, war). These issues must be resolved if the US government hopes to improve the social and political conditions of those embroiled in conflict while at the same time bolstering a security posture favorable to US interests in the aftermath of intervention. The three sections of this work thematically present...

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PART I Framing the Problem 1 CONFLICT TERMINATION WITHIN A BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . 3 Interagency Decision Making via Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . 5 The Efficacy of the Policy-Making Process . . 14 Outline of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHOICE . . . . . . . 27 Decision-Making Approaches: Units of Analysis as Delimiters . . . . . . . . . 28 Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Groups as “Less than Rational” Actors . . . . .41 Rationale for Alternative Approaches . . . . . .48 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 CONFLICT TERMINATION MODELS . . . . . . 61 Points or Processes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 Rational Actor Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . 85 Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Approach . . . . 85 US Government Decision Making . . . . . . . . 92 ...