Description Details
To reinvigorate strategic thought within the Air Force, this study addresses a single question: what critical capabilities—through the combatant commanders—will the nation require of the Air Force by 2030?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Supporting Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Air Force Critical Capabilities, 2020–30 . . . . .5 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .13 Air Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . . . . . 17 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .29 Air Diplomacy . ...

Description Details
The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds us that these quality principles apply to emergency response forces, both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creating an environment to spark the highest performance by their subordinates and not as giving up authority or control....

Description Details
According to CMSgt Cari Kent, 30th Space Wing command chief, it is at basic training that Airmen learn everything they need to succeed in the Air Force.1 In recent incidents, Airmen have exhibited unacceptable actions. These range from transporting cruise missiles loaded with warheads from Minot to Barksdale AFB in 2007 and erroneously shipping nuclear-missile fuses to Taiwan in 2006, to other lesser-known infractions in the Air Force. Certainly, the remedy to such attitudes and behaviors could not be simply applying lessons learned at basic training. Or could the application of the basics taught to initial trainees have changed the course of some of these events? What do Airmen experience at basic training that leads the chief to this conclusion?...

Description Details
This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

Description Details
Colonel Lenderman explores the increase in the number and influence of mobility generals in the late twentieth century and looks toward the future, presenting possible reasons why these generals will continue to rise or why their opportunities may be limited. She concludes by discussing the significance of this study as it pertains to the Air Force’s development and the nation’s security....

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1 MAHAN AND THE PURPOSE OF AIRPOWER . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 THE RISE OF MOBILITY OPERATIONS . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 THE RISE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4 THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
Present and future force presentation options include more than just the single air domain, for the presentation of Air Force operations now includes the air, space, and cyberspace domains....

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DISCLAIMER . . . .ii FUTURE OPERATOR SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS Introduction/Background . . . .1 Methodology . . . .2 Determining the Future Operator Definition . . . . 5 Cross-domain Competencies . . . . 7 Cross-domain Force Development Path . . . .9 Force Development Paradigms . . . .18 Culture . . . .19 Summary . . . . .21...

Description Details
This paper examines the current USAF criteria for inducting C-130 aircraft into programmed depot maintenance (PDM) based on the mission, design, and series (MDS) of the aircraft. An alternative approach using an analytical model is developed in an attempt to refine the current process....

Description Details
Experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF’s ability to engage time-critical targets. The weakness stems from airpower’s inability to employ force quickly and kill an emerging target before it disappears back into hiding. USAF’s engagement sequence, called the kill chain, is not fast enough to detect, locate, identify, and engage the target. Experience shows that the enemy has used this method of emerging, engaging, and dispersing since the beginning of time, and because it is still effective, the enemy has little reason to change. To help solve this difficulty, this study introduces and investigates two methods—reactive and preemptive—and determines how they might solve the problem in 2010....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . 7 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . .23 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . 43 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . 61...

Description Details
In this paper an Air Force ground commander and scholar, Lt Col Dave Marttala, brings to light a problem previously overlooked in popular discussion: Air Force deployment of large numbers of Airmen to augment the joint ground fight and the consequent breakage of the US war-fighting capability writ large....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Myth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Convoy Airmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Assumptions and Expectations . . . . . . . . . . 7 In-Lieu-of Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Current Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Joint Requirements and Sourcing . . . . . . . . 8 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Popular Criticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Studying the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 CASE STUDY: SECURITY FORCES . . . . . . .17 Description of Security Forces . . . . . ...

Description Details
Colonel Paul “P. J.” McAneny offers an analysis focused on aircraft maintenance but applicable to the entire force and recommends cultural changes to support lasting transformation. He examines the impact of metrics on transformation and evaluates the USAF aircraft maintenance culture. He asks several questions: Can focused metrics precede cultural change? Does the aircraft maintenance community support a Red Is Good culture, in which metrics are used to illuminate problems rather than measure success or failure? If so, is the community a true learning organization that can maximize its impact through continuous process-improvement initiatives? The answers lead Colonel McAneny to recommend several Air Force–level changes to meet long-term aircraft readiness and reliability targets....

Description Details
Regardless of one’s views on the AEF, this paper presents points for discussion as the Air Force comes to grips with both the changing nature of future conflict and the Air Force’s ability to provide the National Command Authorities with a credible aerospace force. We encourage open debate on this critical topic....

Description Details
The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a background chapter that explains the current system, which provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information, shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85...

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General Information iv CSAF Reading List vii Frequently Asked Questions ix Journals 1 Audio Books 5 Air University Numbered Texts 7 Books 11 AFRI Papers 54 Drew Papers 60 Fairchild Papers 63 Maxwell Paper Anthology 67 Maxwell Papers 70 Occasional Papers 82 SAASS Papers 84 Walker Papers 91 Wright Flyer Papers 97 Author Index 112 Title Index 114...

Description Details
The use of the heavy bomber during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is just one more chapter on the flexibility of airpower. Bombers in the early stages of the war destroyed the Taliban air force on the ground and the limited air-to-air defenses, as well as disrupting command and control nodes. Orbiting close over problem areas, heavy bombers, guided by ground terminal attack controllers, precisely struck key targets. The bombers were supplying something different than traditional CAS. This new form of warfare used small parties of ground troops in support of the massive firepower that the bombers could provide. Each war is different; and in this case, there were virtually no external threats to the bombers. With total air dominance and the freedom to range over the battlefield at will, utilizing heavy bombers in the GAPS role was possible. This combination of the JDAM along with improved communications systems made this new mission a reality. With the success of these operations, Colonel Theisen believes the USAF should initiate doctrine, rules of engagement, and training changes to accommodate this mission....

Description Details
The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest “ends” that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited “ways” and “means” be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen. Spaven concludes that “only by accepting the risk of stepping beyond tactical and operational thinking can the Air Force do great things for the poorest of continents.”...

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1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2 AIRPOWER IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 CURRENT US ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 4 WHAT CAN AIRMEN EXPECT IN AFRICA? . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 5 HOW SHOULD AIRMEN THINK ABOUT AFRICA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 6 CONCLUSION: A US AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75...

Description Details
Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Leadership and Morale in Air Combat . . . . .91 Existing Thoughts on Military Morale . . . . . .92 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 2 THE MORALE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Who Is the Leader? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Morale: The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Power of Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Maintaining Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3 MAJ ADOLF GALLAND: JAGDGESCHWADER 26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Germany’s Battle for Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Jagdgeschwader 26 in the Battle of Britain . .30 Pilot Morale within Jagdgeschwader 26 . . . . 31 Galland’s Influence on Morale . . . . . . . . . . 38 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

Table of Contents Details
PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

Table of Contents Details
Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...