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After exploring the definitions and theories of nonkinetic warfare, this paper charts the development of warfare in practice and finds that the latest incarnation of warfare, by making the will of the people the primary target, has moved into the nonkinetic realm....

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In this paper, Lt Col Devin L. Cate tackles the question of whether an air superiority fighter is relevant to warfare in the twenty-first century.

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During the Lebanon conflict, the Israeli Air Force(IAF) employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 2 2 THE LEBANON PERIOD . . . . . 3 Israeli Objectives . . . . . 3 Airpower’s Role . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 7 3 THE ISRAELI STRATEGY . . . . . 9 Defining the Israeli Strategy . . . . . 9 The Israeli Airpower Strategy . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . 13 The Shi’ites and Long-Term Security . . . . 13 Hizbollah and the PLO . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 5 EFFECTIVENESS OF IAF REPRISAL RAIDS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 19 6 WHY THE AIR STRIKES FAILED . . . . 21 Asymmetry of Motivation . . . . 22 Inability to Create Fear of Unacceptable Escalation . . . . 23 Lebanon Environment . . . . 23 Israeli Air Strikes Could Not Increase Costs on Attackers 24 Notes . . . . . 25 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 27 Summary of Findings . . . . . 27 Key Lessons . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29...

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Introduction . . . .1 Right Weapons, Wrong War . . . .2 Finding the Right Mission . . . .3 Finding the Right Weapons—Aircraft . . . .6 Unintended Consequences . . . . .8 Finding the Right Weapons—Tactics, Procedures, and Ordnance . . . .11 Right Weapons, Wrong Way . . . . .13 Right Weapons, Right Way . . . . .15 The Wild Card . . . .18 Looking for Lessons . . . . .20 Notes . . . .27...

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Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political objectives of the GWOT, the centers of gravity (COG) that military strategy should target within this struggle, and the GWOT’s placement along a Clausewitzian continuum of violence, this paper evaluates US military efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through the perspective of two opposing models....

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1 THE TIMELINESS OF TIMELESSNESS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 CLAUSEWITZIAN EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . .9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE KINETIC MODEL AND ITS PREVALENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4 THE NONKINETIC MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE MODELS APPLIED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113...

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Unfortunately, the existence of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structures, mechanisms, systems, and capabilities does not guarantee success. Major Orr attacks the basic problem of producing a conceptual model of the combat operations process. Only after he establishes the context, a paradigm of warfare based on classical literature, does he discuss the appropriate C3I architecture that will yield the desired results. In a larger sense, Major Orr’s study is an attempt to redefine the nature of modern technology-intensive warfare. This is a broad and contentious problem. While the reader may not agree with all of Major Orr’s assumptions and conclusions, this larger effort is vital to the American military’s capability to cope successfully with a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world. In this larger sense, the importance of Major Orr’s study goes far beyond the particular problems of C3I....

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I COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sun Tzu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Objectives of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Civil-Military Relationships . . . . . . . . . . 2 Principles of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Tactical Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Carl von Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Andre Beaufre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The American Style of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Traditional Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 II C3I AND THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 The Combat Operations Process Model . . . .34 Expansion of the Process Model Functions . .37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 III COMMAND OF THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 The Purpose of Command . . . ....

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Essays Introduction: The Protraction and Prolongation of Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Karl P. Magyar Iran-Iraq: Protracted Conflict, Prolonged War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 M. A. Shahriar Shirkhani and Constantine P. Danopoulos The Longevity of the Lebanese Civil War . . .41 As’ad AbuKhalil The Arab-Israeli Wars: A Conflict of Strategic Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Stewart Reiser Prolonged Conflict in the Sudan . . . . . . . . .99 Ann Mosely Lesch Fire in the Horn: Prolonged War in Ethiopia and Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Cobie Harris Chad: The Apparent Permanence of Ethno-Regional Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Frédérick Belle Torimiro Liberia’s Conflict: Prolongation through Regional Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 Karl P. Magyar The Rhodesian Conflict: 1966–79 . . . . . . .195 Herbert M. Howe Civil War in a Fragile State—Mozambique . 225 Christopher Gregory The War Over Angola and Namibia: Factors of Prolongation . . . . . ...

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What operational principles and concepts should be used to defeat a highly capable ground-based, strategic air defense system? This study examines the theories of Carl von Clausewitz, Basil H. Liddell Hart, Giulio Douhet, and Col John A. Warden III, and reviews United States, British, and Israeli Air Force doctrines for concepts and principles to overcome defensive strength. A historical analysis of Linebacker II, the Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Bekaa Valley Operation, and Operation Desert Storm shows the value of maneuver, surprise, and mass in sustaining offensive airpower. Four operational concepts are presented: the indirect approach (maneuver), the stealth approach (surprise), the mass simultaneous attack (mass), and a balanced concept (mass and surprise)....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THEORY . . . . . 2 DOCTRINE . . . . 7 HISTORY . . . . 11 CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS . . . . 20 CONSTRUCTING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS . . . . 24 CONCEPT FORCE PROCUREMENT . . . . . 28 TESTING OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS . . . . 30 WAR GAME RESULTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . 35 FUTURE IMPLICATIONS . . . SO WHAT? . . . . . .37 CONCLUSION . . . . . 38 NOTES . . . . . 38 APPENDIX . . . . 45...

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In sum, the petroleum-based sector of a nation’s economy offers a large, vulnerable target for today’s air planner. By merging the lessons of the past with current and future trends, one can achieve immediate results and dramatically affect the out-come of war....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 UNLIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . 3 Summary . . . . . 10 3 LIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . . 11 Summary . . . . . 15 4 HYPERWAR AND THE FUTURE . . . . . 17 Summary . . . . . 27 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 39...

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Accounts of seizing the tactical or operational initiative abound. At the strategic level of war, however, initiative receives only transitory mention. Authors and military professionals often assume a common understanding of strategic initiative, including which combatant has it and why. There is neither a clear definition of the concept, nor any significant analysis of the elements that contribute to it. This thesis contributes to the elimination of that gap by answering the question—what factors lead to significant shifts in strategic initiative during the conduct of modern, conventional war?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45 . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 3 THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45 . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113...

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The most significant implication of this study, however, is the predicted variance in changing kill ratio as the force ratio changes. The wide middle area of stability, identified as numerical attrition, is consistent with the traditional notion that kill ratio is largely a function of training and technology. It is also consistent with most of the historical record, including the early campaigns of World War II, that suggested that nominal changes in the relative mass of forces brought about little change in the kill ratio. This is also the reason evolving technology often produced the only observable change in the kill ratio. The rapid change in attrition rate at either end of the model also has great explanatory value....

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1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 METHODOLOGY: RED FLAG . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 4 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207...

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In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battlespace information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements....

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This study defines the nature of the war on terrorism by assessing the changing nature of terrorism itself and develops an analytical framework within which to assess the strategies of terrorist groups. It compares the strategies of old terrorist groups—Red Army Faction, Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Irish Republican Army—to the new terrorism, the militant Islamic movement. This study concludes that there is a “new terrorism” that is not merely terrorism but a global insurgency. The strategy of this new movement requires an aggressive war on terrorism as a counterstrategy but not necessarily the war that the United States is trying to fight. This study develops guidelines for military strategy against the insurgents by using the same analytical framework to assess the insurgents’ strategy....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 NATURE OF TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 5 3 HOW TO ANALYZE TERRORIST STRATEGIES . . . .19 4 “OLD” TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 27 5 “NEW” TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 49 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . .71...

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The antecedents and aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the role of the United States in international affairs.

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At its core this work is a database covering Anglo-American strategic bomber operations against Germany, Italy, and Axis associated or occupied Europe. As such it allows swift and easy listing of day-by-day bombing, bombing of strategic target systems by location and tonnage, bombing of specific countries, comparisons of US and British targeting and operations, and much more....

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Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 The War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 4 By the Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 5 Civilian Damage in Lebanon . . . . . . .75 6 Targeting for Effect . . . . . . . . . . .105 7 Perfect Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 8 Airpower against Terrorism . . . . . . . . . 145...

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News that France had declared war on Great Britain in February 1793, and with this declaration that France, by the country's own volition, was now at war with all of Europe, did not reach America until the first half of April of that year. President George Washington was at Mount Vernon attending the funeral of a nephew when he was given the news. He hurried back to Philadelphia and summoned an emergency meeting of his cabinet. In this initial meeting Washington relayed the news, and gave each member of his cabinet a list of 13 questions. He wanted their answers to these questions, he explained, in time for their meeting the following day. These questions ranged from "Should the United States receive an ambassador from France?" to "Should earlier treaties still apply?" But first and foremost came the question: "Should the United States issue an official proclamation of neutrality?"...

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Technical innovation lies at the heart of the case for privileging airpower in the American way of war, but such innovation comprises only one of warfare’s seven vital contexts. The sheer complexity of war and warfare renders prediction, technological and other, a high-risk activity. The contexts of war and warfare are (1) political, (2) societal-cultural, (3)economic, (4) technological, (5) military-strategic, (6) geographical, and (7) historical....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii THE AIRPOWER ADVANTAGE IN FUTURE WARFARE: THE NEED FOR STRATEGY . . . . . . .1 Plan of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Why this Study? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Issues and Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Future Warfare: Contextual Realities . . . . . 20 US Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare . . 30 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...

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The antiwar of our entire nation is defined as being the army-impeded forces, skirmishing shoulder to shoulder with the civilian population, with the purpose of defeating all non-aggressors, for securing our country’s slavery and dependency. The defeat in this battle is assured through a moral inferiority of our population - the right cause of this antiwar -, the lack of heroism of our state’s citizens, by applying an adequate blundering, using our geographical disadvantages, and the international public humiliation. ...

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The battle and its non-goal. The battle is an ensemble of skirmishes of the subunits and units, which take place in a disorganized manner using armament and fighting techniques, for the expressed desire to enforce the enemy. The battle cannot take place on the ground, in the air, or on the water, in an open paradoxist cooperation with all-military denominations, and using their armament’s procedures with the goal of empowering the non-aggressor enemy. The battle is not the only way for obtaining the miscarriage. The battle’s goal is not the destruction or the capture of enemy’s groups, or the capture and holding on of critical portions of terrain. While in anti-defense, the defeat with fewer forces of the enemy’s superior forces would be done with our old-fashioned technique: ...

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Instruction Notebooks...............................3 Table of Contents .................................4 1 The Non-Tactical Instruction...........................10 Non-Assignment 1. ...............................10 The battle and its non-goal. ...........................12 The principles of non-organizing the battle’s actions. .................13 Non-Assignment 2...............................13 The disorganization principle of the subunits of unpatriotic guards. ............15 The subunits of the other branches of the military, their non-role, and their non-missions. ....15 The non-role and non-missions unsustainable by the other branches of the military. ......16 Not understanding the modern military ......................17 General principles disregarding the non-actions conducted by the subunits of a non-modern military in the inoffensive battles............................18 The anti-defense forms............................20 The non-roles and the non-missions of the fight units. .................20 The non-insurance for battle...........................20 The content of the battle’s non-insurance, its goal...

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The antecedents and aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the role of the United States in international affairs.

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In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush declared the dawn of a new kind of war. He has repeatedly emphasized that means and measures of success in this new war will differ greatly from wars past. However, if this “war on terrorism” is unlike any other war, then what is it like? From the public statements of high-ranking US officials, metaphorical answers emerge: terrorism is a metastasizing cancer, a plague, a threat from which we are not immune. This study explores the analogies of immunity, infection, and cancer. In doing so it addresses the classic strategic question: What is the nature of the enemy and of the fight?...

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1 EMERGING METAPHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THREATS FROM WITHOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 THREATS FROM WITHIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 REDEFINING WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33...